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I. Introduction
This article considers how the international business best
strategically accounts for the various legal environments in which
it operates. In light of globalization's prominence, it seems
strange that so little literature has investigated the law's role in
international business strategy. Questions thus arise: how can the
law engender competitive advantage across jurisdictions, and how
should international executives and their counsel approach the law
strategically? This article submits that the answers to these
questions largely turn upon meaningfully defining "the rule of
law" and on the recognition of a new breed of attorney-the
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entrepreneurial lawyer. This article proposes a framework to
guide the synthesis of law and international strategy.
Nearly a decade has passed since Larry Downes presciently
observed that "[l]aw is the last great untapped source of
competitive advantage."' Yet "the gulf between the lawyer and
Managers view the regulatory
strategist remains wide.
environment as an impediment to growth," while "[1]awyers train
primarily to advocate rather than to counsel"2 and to minimize
their clients' exposure to risk.3 The dissonance between managers
and attorneys has led to the law's pronounced neglect as a
strategic business resource.'

Discussing the law's role in competitive advantage raises a
serious challenge: virtually all of the literature on point assumes a

high rule of law backdrop and, in particular, takes for granted the
presence and correctness of Western institutions.' Still, "it may be
possible to build a definition of the rule of law around a central
tenet of Western and non-Western traditions." 6 By necessity,
defining the "rule of law" is a fluid, qualitative process, but it need
not be arbitrary. While this article addresses some abstractions, its

I Larry Downes, First, Empower All the Lawyers, 82 HARV. Bus. REV. 19, 19
(2004).
2 Robert C. Bird, The Many Futures ofLegal Strategy, 47 AM. Bus. L.J. 575, 575
(2010). Most firms neglect the law, treat it as a rank constraint, or lobby for favorable
laws; few firms view the law as an opportunity. Antoine Masson, The Crucial Role of
Legal Capability in the Realisation of Legal Strategies, in LEGAL STRATEGIES: How
CORPORATIONS USE LAW TO IMPROVE PERFORMANCE 101, 114 (Antoine Masson & Mary

J. Shariffeds., 2010); accord Robert C. Bird, Pathways of Legal Strategy, 14 STAN. J.L.
Bus. & FIN. 1, 8 (2008) ("In virtually every industry, there is no consistent way firms
address legal issues.").
3 See Downes, supra note 1, at 19.
4 See Bird, The Many Futures of Legal Strategy, supra note 2, at 575.
5 See, e.g., Robert L. Nelson & Lee Cabatingan, A Preface and Introduction, in
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RULE OF LAW 3 (James J. Heckman et al. eds., 2010) ("A

related concern is whether the terminology of the rule of law contains an effort to impose
a Western or perhaps even a United States perspective of law on the rest of the
world ....
It would be wrongheaded to equate the rule of law with a particular legal
tradition's prescriptions for the character and role of legal institutions."); see also infra
Part III.A (discussing the many definitions of "the rule of law").
6 Nelson & Cabatingan, supra note 5, at 3; accord Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law
and Its Virtues, in LIBERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 3, 7 (Robert L. Cunningham ed.,

1979) ("Many of the principles that can be derived from ... the rule of law depend for
their validity or importance on the particular circumstances of different societies.").
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most basic inquiry is the practical question of how managers and
their counsel ought to account for the law in international business
strategy. This article contends that the "rule of law" describes the
very realm of opportunity for strategic legal advantage. Extracting
competitive value across jurisdictions requires that we understand
the "rule of law" from the business perspective-in effect, the
extent to which legal institutions reallocate business opportunities
away from the market and into the legal and political systems of a
given jurisdiction.
Countries observe the rule of law in different ways and to
differing degrees. Western impulses prefer "high rule of law"
jurisdictions: transparent legal systems that empower firms to
plan and act in the economic realm.' Correspondingly, firms
disfavor "low rule of law" jurisdictions where opaque legal
systems create economic uncertainties and risks." Jurisdictional
rule of law differences can be traced to several basic sources of
legal flexibility." Depending upon their variety and prevalence,
these flexibilities create both legal risks and legal opportunities.12
Using the framework proposed here to identify strategic
opportunities in the law, the entrepreneurial lawyer is then poised
to integrate the law with the client's strategy.13
A few general items are noteworthy. First, whereas the
recognition of opportunities for legal advantage may require a
macro-perspective, the question of how best to capitalize upon
opportunity is driven by the individual firm's vantage. Second,
this article is concerned only with "legitimate" legal functions.
7 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW 114-26 (2004) ("Realpolitik

remains a predictable mainstay of international law.").
8 See generally infra Part 111.
9 See David Silverstein & Daniel C. Hohler, A Rule-of-Law Metric for
Quantifying and Assessing the Changing Legal Environment ofBusiness, 47 AM. Bus. L.
J. 795, 796 (2010) (noting that Rupert Murdoch declared that he would prefer to invest in
India over China because India had a rule of law, whereas China presented unknown
risks and barriers).
10 See id.
11 See infra Part III.C.

See Silverstein & Hohler, supra note 9, at 798 ("On the other hand, many
societies lacking in one or more of the supposed minimum set of legal criteria
nevertheless exhibit a thriving business sector ... and clear paths toward sustainable
economic growth.").
13 See infra Part IV.
12
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This article adopts Suchman's conception: "[1]egitimacy is a
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions."' 4
Organizations must manage their legitimacy,'" but "[b]ecause
informal institutions vary widely across cultures, what is
illegitimate in one culture may be widely seen as legitimate in
others."" Finally, we embrace North's institutional typology:"
"[fjormal institutions refer to laws, regulations, and their
supporting apparatuses ... [;] [i]nformal institutions refer to
norms, values, and beliefs that define socially acceptable
behavior.""
This article's aims are modest: to propose a preliminary model
for utilizing the law in competitive advantage and to suggest areas
of future research.' 9 This article is the first work of which the
authors are aware to propose and develop linkages between the
rule of law, legal competitive advantage, and legal
entrepreneurship.
Part II of this article addresses several relevant links between
law and business. Part III concerns the discovery of opportunities
to use the law in competitive advantage; as such, it explores the
nature of the legal system, offers a preliminary rule of law
framework, and defines the "rule of law" in a manner meaningful
Part IV then considers how legal
to international firms.
opportunities are best cultivated as sources of competitive
advantage. This is accomplished by developing the idea of legal

14 Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional
Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 574 (1995).
15 Id at 585-601.
16 Justin W. Webb, Laszlo Tihanyi, R. Duane Ireland & David G. Sirmon, You Say
Illegal, I Say Legitimate: Entrepreneurshipin the Informal Economy, 34 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 492, 506 n.4 (2009).
17 Id. at 494.
18 Id. at 494-95.
19 For example, the rule of law might be quantified. Such an endeavor is beyond
the scope here, but this is not problematic, for qualitative work is "well suited to support
and facilitate comprehension of phenomena that are not well understood... and to
develop existing theory 'by pointing to gaps and beginning to fill them."' Johanna Mair
& Ignasi Marti, EntrepreneurshipIn and Around Institutional Voids: A Case Study From
Bangladesh, 24 J. Bus. VENTURING 419, 424 (2009) (citation omitted).
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entrepreneurship. Part V concludes the article.
II. An Overview of the Law's Role in Strategy and
Competitive Advantage
A. What Do "Strategy" and "Competitive Advantage"
Mean?
"Strategy is about seeking a competitive edge over rivals"20 by
discovering and exploiting "value-creating opportunities." 2
International strategy, then, concerns the discovery and
exploitation of value-creating opportunities within and across
foreign environments.
Most business literature approaches
international strategy along two well-established lines:
the
industry-based view, which "argues that conditions within an
industry ... determine firm strategy and performance," and the
resource-based view, which "suggests that it is firm-specific
differences that drive strategy and performance."22
Peng and his coauthors propose that although the industry and
resource views are insightful, they neglect the context in which
competition occurs.2
"This is not surprising, because [the]
industry- and resource-based views arise primarily out of research
on competition in the United States, in which it may seem
reasonable to assume a relatively stable market-based institutional
framework."2 4 As we will see, the existing "law as competitive
advantage" literature also assumes a high rule of law context.25
Yet advanced institutions are not descriptive of most
jurisdictions.26 "[T]here is increasing appreciation that formal and

20 George S. Day, Maintaining the Competitive Edge: Creating and Sustaining
Advantages in Dynamic Competitive Environments, in WHARTON ON DYNAMIC
COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 48, 48 (George S. Day & David J. Reibstein eds., 1997).
21 Gerald Keim, Business and Public Policy: Competing in the Political
Marketplace, in THE BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 583, 583
(Michael A. Hitt, R. Edward Freedman & Jeffery S. Harrison eds., 2001).
22 Mike W. Peng, Denis Y.L. Wang & Yi Jiang, An Institution-Based View of

International Business Strategy: A Focus on Emerging Economies, 39 J. INT'L Bus.
STUD. 920, 920 (2008).
23 Id. at 920.
24 Id. at 921.

25 See infra Part II.D.
26 Peng, Wang & Jiang, supra note 22, at 921.
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informal institutions ... significantly shape the strategy and
performance of firms ... in emerging economies." 27 As such, the
existing literature has little applicability to legal competitive
advantage internationally.
Peng and his colleagues argue persuasively that institutions
should be the third leg in the "strategy tripod"-a robust
international strategy will account for industry-based and firmspecific considerations, as well as for institutional realities. 28
"[A]n institution based view of strategy focuses on the dynamic
interaction between institutions and organizations" such that
strategic choices are "a reflection of the formal and informal
constraints of a particular institutional framework that managers
confront." 29 This article focuses on how a key institution-the
law-should be harnessed to the firm's advantage in widely
varying institutional contexts.
Competitive advantage is simply "an advantage over your
competitors.""o Oberman observes that "business organizations
can treat social and political institutions as firm resources,
effectively creating . . . institutional resources."'

Institutional

resources "cannot be perfectly controlled by a firm, but can
nonetheless often be exploited . .. to achieve or maintain
competitive advantage."32 The law is one such institutional
resource.
Competitive advantages derived from institutional
sources are fundamentally different from advantages achieved
through industry characteristics or firm assets.33 Part IV.D.1 will
discuss the point further.

27 Id.; accord Ted London & Stuart L. Hart, Reinventing Strategiesfor Emerging
Markets: Beyond the Transnational Model, 35 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 350, 352 (2004)
(noting the prevalence of informal institutions in developing countries and the success of
firms that leverage them).
28 Peng, Wang & Jiang, supra note 22, at 921.
29 Id. at 922-23.
30

GEORGE SIEDEL, USING THE LAW FOR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 4 (2002).

31 William D. Oberman, Strategy and Tactic Choice in an Institutional Resource
Context, in CORPORATE POLITICAL AGENCY 213, 215 (Barry M. Mitnick ed., 1993).
32 Id at 214-15.

33 See id at 215-16.
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B. The Law andIts Relevance to InternationalBusiness
It is necessary to first define "law" before attempting to define
the "rule of law." Many definitions exist. 34 For Roscoe Pound,
"law" has three meanings: (1) "the legal order-the regime of
adjusting relations and ordering conduct by the systematic and
orderly application of the force of a politically organized society,"
(2) "[t]he body of authoritative materials of or grounds of or
guides to determination," and (3) "the process of [actually]
determining causes and controversies according to the
authoritative guides."3 If these three meanings "can be unified, it
is by the idea of social control."36 Thus, "the law is whatever is
done officially."37
Because this article seeks a practical
framework, it embraces Pound's realist view.
The state can exert control by several means, including
command regulation, self-regulation, and incentive-based
regimes. 3 9 "[l]n most regulatory contexts combinations of [these]
methods tend to be employed."4 0 "Regulation often appears to be
a game in which the rules are uncertain, the method of scoring is
in dispute[,] and the distinction between players and spectators is
unclear." 41 "This is because regulators' mandates tend to be
imprecise" and because regulators "carry out a number of
functions that are not always compatible," such as exercising
control but also enabling markets.4 2 Regulators must encourage

34 See, e.g., WILLIAM SEAGLE, THE QUEST FOR LAW 4 (1941)

(listing various

definitions of "law" over time and across cultures).
35

ROSCOE POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 40 (1942).

36 Id at 41.
37 Id. at 40; accord DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW 2 (1976) ("Law is

governmental social control."); SEAGLE, supra note 34, at 7 ("[L]aw is a mode of
regulating conduct by means of sanctions imposed by politically organized society.").
38 Some philosophical commentaries help to illuminate the law's practical facets.
See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-39 (revised ed. 1978) (discussing

the eight conditions under which legal systems fail).
39 ROBERT BALDWIN & MARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING
(1999).
40 Id. at 57.
41 Id at 334.
42

Id

REGULATION

35-55
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efficiency and other social goals; they must balance various
interests and trade-offs.4 Rarely can regulators "deal with issues
in isolation." 4 4 "[R]ules are necessary in a world of uncertainty
and incomplete knowledge. They arise from the complexity of the
environment[,] the computational limitations of the individual. . .
and the importance of predicting the behavior of' others. 45 The
value of rules as behavioral guides varies across societies.4 6
International strategy must account for rules, for "[m]anagement is
largely concerned with issues whose outcomes are uncertain."9
The law is a regulatory institution: 48 "regulative processes
involve the capacity to establish rules, inspect or review others'
conformity to them, and as necessary, manipulate sanctions ... in
an attempt to influence future behavior."4 9 Similarly, the "rational
materialist" view "sees organizations as rational wealth
maximizers and sees the law as a system of substantive incentives
and penalties.. .. Thus, organizations instrumentally invoke or
evade the law, in a strategic effort to 'engineer' legal activities that
bring the largest possible payoff at the least possible cost.""o We
accept these views but further urge that the law can and should be
used to the firm's competitive advantage.'
"Successful business strategy is about actively shaping the
game you play, not just playing the game you find."52 This is
particularly true in international business,53 where the firm must

43

Id.

44

Id.at 335.

SVETOZAR PEJOVICH, EcoNoMic ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS AND SYSTEMS 23
(2d ed. 1998).
46 See id.
47 P.G. Moore, The Manager's Struggles with Uncertainty, 140 J. ROYAL STAT.
Soc'Y 129, 129 (1977).
45

48

See W. RICHARD ScoTr, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 34-45 (1995).

49 Id at 35.
50 Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The Legal Environment of
Organizations,23 ANN. REv. Soc. 479, 481-82 (1997).
51 See infra Part III.
52 Adam M. Brandenburger & Barry J. Nalebuff, The Right Game: Use Game
Theory to Shape Strategy, in HARV. Bus. REV. ON MANAGING UNCERTAINTY 67, 70-71

(1999).
53 See Keim, supra note 21, at 583 (noting that opportunities and threats evolve
from the interaction between firms and institutions).

N.C. J. INT'L L. &COM. REG.

342

Vol. XXXIX

proactively shape its legal game.5 4 Doing so requires a distinctive
type of lawyer." "Legal counselors to transnational enterprises
have to approach their work differently. They need to understand
their business clients' global objectives and strategies, their
competitive strengths and weaknesses, [and] their strategic
competencies . . . "56 Most significantly, global attorneys must be

entrepreneurial."
C. Existing Literatureon the Law as Competitive Advantage
Few scholars have considered the law a source of competitive
advantage." Four major works have begun exploring this topic:59
George Siedel's Using the Law for Competitive Advantage,
Constance Bagley's Winning Legally: How to Use the Law to
Create Value, MarshalResources, and Manage Risk, G. Richard
Shell's Make the Rules or Your Rivals Will, and the multi-author
Legal Strategies: How Corporations Use Law to Improve
Performance. A few articles are also relevant."o
This literature is praiseworthy for its willingness to consider
the law's potential upside and for its position that firms should
take a proactive approach toward the law. 6 ' Bagley rightly
observes that "[m]anagers who view the law purely as a
constraint ... will miss opportunities to use the law and the legal

54 Clarence J. Mann, Forces Shaping the Global Business Environment, in

1, 18 (Clarence J. Mann & Klaus Gotz eds., 2006) (noting several
studies that identify the legal system as one of the most important influences on foreign
investment decisions).
55 See generally infra Part IV (introducing and discussing the "entrepreneurial
lawyer").
56 William G. Frenkel, The FragmentedLegal Environment of Global Business, in
BORDERLESS BUSINESS 144, 158 (Clarence J. Mann & Klaus Gotz eds., 2006).
57 See infra Part IV (discussing legal entrepreneurship).
58 Bird, The Many Futures of Legal Strategy, supra note 2, at 575 ("The full
potential of law as a value-added business tool has only begun to emerge in the academic
literature.").
59 Id at 582-83. Siedel's work is the most extensive on the law as competitive
advantage, but its theoretical scope is limited to rudimentary legal planning in the United
States context. The other works offer somewhat more substantively valuable insights,
but without any significant demonstration of the far-reaching implications of their
claims; they, too, are limited to the high rule of law context.
60 Id. at 576-83 (reviewing these articles).
61 See id at 576.
BORDERLESS BUSINESS
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system to increase both the total value created and the share of that
value captured by the firm." 62 Regulation clearly imposes costs,63

some of which are hidden.' But regulation also presents great
opportunities to the firm.s
A related body of literature argues that international firms can
utilize political strategies, the aim of which "is to obtain a
competitive advantage through effectively interfacing with
noneconomic actors, including the government.. .. '[I]f a firm
cannot be a cost, differentiation or focus leader, it may still beat
the competition on another ground, namely, the non-market
environment."' 66 Similarly, Elizabeth Bailey observes that "[t]he
strategic interaction between the private and the public sectors
needs to be understood as a dynamic driver of competitive
advantage .... Public sector policies can create and help sustain
competitive advantage for firms, or can undermine and even
destroy advantages." 67 Additionally, Bagley writes that "[i]nstead
of just reacting to regulations after they are adopted, firms can
propose rules that would be favorable to them by lobbying and
engaging in other political activities. " Thus, firms can utilize the
regulatory process to frustrate competitors 69 and to seek
62 Constance E. Bagley, What's Law Got to Do With It?: Integrating Law and
Strategy, 47 AM. Bus. L.J. 587, 588 (2010).
63 See generallyPETER CHINLOY, THE COST OF DOING BUSINESS (1989) (discussing
the costs imposed upon firms by the regulatory apparatus in the United States and
abroad).
64 Id. at 3.
65 Barry M. Mitnick, The Strategic Uses of Regulation-And Deregulation, in
CORPORATE POLITICAL AGENCY 67, 67 (Barry M. Mitnick ed., 1993) ("The publicized

costs to business in some areas of regulation do not fairly represent the range of
regulatory impacts; in fact, regulation [provides] significant . .. business
opportunities.").

66 Allen J. Morrison & Kendall Roth, InternationalBusiness-Level Strategy: The
Development of a Holistic Model, in INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 29, 36
(Anant R. Negandhi & Arun Savara eds., 1989). This article makes somewhat different

arguments. Legal competitive advantage is necessary even if the firm is a cost,
differentiation, or focus leader, and legal advantage can help the firm to become a cost,
differentiation, or focus leader.

67 Elizabeth E. Bailey, Integrating Policy Trends into Dynamic Advantage, in
WHARTON ON DYNAMIC COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 76, 77 (George S. Day & David J.
Reibstein eds., 1997).
68 Bagley, supra note 62, at 590.

69 ROGER G. NOLL & BRUCE M. OWEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
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substantive changes to the law.70 While these are helpful ideas in
advanced markets, the next section illustrates how greatly they
must be modified to apply outside of places like the United States.
D. Why GlobalizationMatters: Limits of the Existing
Literature
In many jurisdictions, the international firm is caught between
powerful tidal forces. Western multinationals "long accustomed
to the rule of law must come to terms with the rule of man,"" but
at the same time, states must embrace law (at least in some form)
if they are to participate in the global economy. 72
A few works in strategy and economics note that most
scholarship assumes a strong institutional context.7 ' The existing
"law as competitive advantage" research makes this assumption as
well.74 The insights and recommendations of this literature are
valid, but are limited to jurisdictions in which high rule of law
conditions prevail.7 5 On the international scope, assuming a strong
institutional context begs the very question: the character and
prevalence of strategic legal opportunities depend upon the nature
of the legal system. 7 6 Western companies "in emerging-market
economies cannot take existing institutions and business practices
for granted, as they are still evolving and inexperienced."n
Examples illustrate the literature's high rule of law
DEREGULATION 39 (1983).

70 See generally Bailey, supra note 67 (discussing why firms should be proactive
in shaping the law in addition to complying with it).
71 JOHN J. DANIELS, LEE H. RADEBAUGH & DANIEL P. SULLIVAN, INTERNATIONAL

BUSINESS 116 (14th ed. 2013).

72 See Kathryn Hendley, The Rule of Law and Economic Development in a Global
Era, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 605, 605 (Austin Sarat ed.,

2004).
73 See, e.g., Peng, Wang & Jiang, supra note 22, at 920-21; Matthew C.
Stephenson, Legal Realism for Economists, 23 J. Eco. PERSP. 191, 191 (2009) ("Most
economic theory presumes-often implicitly-a system of law and adjudication.").
74 See infra Part II.D.
75 Some scholars in other disciplines recognize the impact of the institutional
assumption. See, e.g., DANIELS, RADEBAUGH & SULLIVAN, supra note 71, at 115;
PEJOVICH, supra note 45, at 16.

76 See Frenkel, supra note 56, at 144 ("[T]he work of international business
attorneys is shaped by varying and often conflicting jurisdictions and legal systems.").
77 Id. at 149.
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assumption. Bird's pathways to legal strategy" are embodied by
American companies in the American legal context,79 and his
examples do not contemplate markets outside the United States."
Of course, as Noll and Owen note, "[riegulated firms can use the
regulatory mechanism itself to impose costs and delays on their
would-be competitors."'
But strategy concerns more than
saddling rivals with red tape; legal competitive advantage should
focus primarily upon positioning one's own firm uniquely.82
Robert Ackerman's model assumes a high rule of law.83
According to Ackerman, a "zone of discretion" exists-a time in
which "astute and perceptive managers have considerable
opportunities to slow or ... reverse emerging legal regulation."84
Silverstein and Hohler suggest that Ackerman's model has been
ignored because business intervention in the policy process is
ethically disquieting." But Ackerman's real difficulty is that he
assumes a high rule of law: in order for all regulated parties to
have the opportunity to effectively intervene in the law-making
process, a reasonably transparent and stable system, as well as the
liberty to challenge the state, are required-all hallmarks of the
high rule of law. Firms can do far more than simply lobby to
change the law's content. Moreover, as Ackerman implies, the
manager's discretion is not the only relevant viewpoint; the degree
of discretion invested in authorities is equally important.86 Legal
78 Bird, Pathways of Legal Strategy, supra note 2, at 12-38 (discussing his
strategies of avoidance, compliance, prevention, advantage, and transformation).
79 See generally id (discussing such firms as PepsiCo, Google, IBM, and Lincoln
Electric Company).
80 See generally id. (focusing only on companies' operations in the United States).

supra note 69, at 39.
Hitting one's rivals with onerous regulations may constitute a competitive
advantage if it can be replicated consistently. But the efficacy and efficiency of this
approach is doubtful, particularly in a free market where competitors may be numerous,
enter and exit the industry frequently, and adapt quickly, and in high rule of law
environments, where such strategies may be viewed as frivolous or as otherwise
illegitimate.
83 Silverstein & Hohler, supra note 9, at 804-06 (2010) (citing and discussing
Robert W. Ackerman, How Companies Respond to Social Demands, 51 HARV. Bus.
REV. 88 (1973)).
81

NOLL & OWEN,

82

84 Id. at 805.

85 Id. at 805 n.35.
86 See Robert W. Ackerman, How Companies Respond to Social Demands, 51
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costs and legal risks may tend to rise as regulations become more
numerous and complex,87 but whether strategic opportunities are
also correspondingly reduced is a function of the jurisdiction's
rule of law observation." Indeed, some jurisdictions, such as
China, have shown the opposite-formal laws are more numerous
today than thirty years ago, yet no opportunities for legal
entrepreneurship existed then, whereas today they are bountiful.89
Mitnick's work assumes the uniform application of law.90
Discussing the fact that regulation may produce a net benefit for
regulated firms, Mitnick asserts that "although any one firm may
not be better off compared to the preregulation state, that firm may
yet be in a position of comparative advantage with other compliant
firms."9 ' This observation is undoubtedly valid in states with a
truly uniform application of laws, but since most jurisdictions do
not fit this ideal, the international relevance of Mitnick's
observation is greatly circumscribed. 92
Bagley argues that the exploitation of legal "loopholes" is per
se wrong and that many companies deliberately violate the law. 93
However, this assumes that unlawful conduct is defined with
reasonable clarity. In lower rule of law environments, "creative
compliance" is not fraudulent; it is invited-even necessitatedby the legal system's design. In some locations, all legal
compliance might necessarily be "creative" by Western
standards.94
HARV. Bus. REV. 88,90 (1973).
87 Legal and political risks will also rise as the volume and quality of regulation
descend below a certain threshold. See infra Part III.B.
88 See generally infra Part III (examining the law's potential role in company
strategy).

89

See generally KEMING YANG, ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN CHINA (2007) (discussing

the growth of the Chinese economy in relation to the country's evolving reforms).
90

See BARRY M. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION 1-20 (1980)

(discussing the definition and object of regulation).
91

Id. at 70.

92 See Frenkel, supra note 56, at 144 ("The biggest hurdle for global companies
from a legal perspective remains fragmentation of business law among nations whose
legal systems function largely in isolation of one another.").
93 See Bagley, supranote 62, at 619-23.
94 Even firms in high rule of law environments seek to avoid adverse rules through
"creative compliance"-"the process whereby those regulated avoid having to break the
rules ... by circumventing the scope of a rule." BALDWIN & CAVE, supra note 39, at
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Some theories contend that globalization will spur a
convergence of cultures and laws,95 but this is doubtful. Cultural
differences and local interests will remain highly influential in
international business," and although a higher degree of
commonality now exists than at any other time, the laws of nations
are far from converging.9 7 "[R]ather than eliminating diversity,
globalization reorders diversity. Localities are forever changing
but they are certainly not disappearing."98
Most strategy research (on which the "law as competitive
advantage" literature relies) also neglects the law's institutional
role.99 For instance, Chinloy notes that "[a]ll firms must comply
with the legal system" and that "[s]ome firms are more efficient at
compliance."'o Though this is undoubtedly true, Chinloy assumes
the luxury of relatively few legal uncertainties.'"' In any legal
system, the question for managers and their counsel ought not to
be compliance alone, but also whether the firm can affirmatively

103.
95 See, e.g., George J. Siedel & Helena Haapio, Using Proactive Law for
Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. Bus. L.J. 641, 645-47 (2010) (arguing that laws have
converged across countries to such a degree that comparative legal advantage can no
longer be achieved). Siedel previously argued that "the law itself is being globalizedthus creating an increasingly level playing field for business and new opportunities to
use the law for competitive advantage." George Siedel, Six Forces and the Legal
Environment of Business: The Relative Value of Business Law among Business School
Core Courses, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 717, 733 (2000). For Siedel, then, the law's potential as
a source of competitive advantage depends upon similarities across countries. This
article submits that meaningful similarities are rare; the institutional diferences between
countries afford the principal opportunities for legal competitive advantages.
96 See generally Geert Hofstede, The Cultural Relativity of Organizational
Practices and Theories, 14 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 75 (1983) (discussing how management
practices should account for cross-cultural differences).

97

JOHN J. WILD & KENNETH L. WILD, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 92 (6th ed. 2012)

(noting that legal differences between countries endure); accord Frenkel, supra note 56,
at 144 ("[T]he harmonization of laws [across countries] . . . remains the rare and limited
exception.").
98

PETER J. TAYLOR, POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 297 (3d ed. 1993).

99 Bailey, supra note 67, at 78.
100 CHINLOY, supra note 63, at 1.
10 Uncertainties and flexibilities exist in high rule of law jurisdictions, but they are
fewer in number and less varied in scope. See infra Parts III.B-D (discussing differing
degrees of legal flexibility).
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benefit from the law. 10 2
For firms in which corporate
entrepreneurship prevails,'o3 this focus will come naturally.
Bailey argues that firms should attempt to influence the
substance of the law through lobbying.104 The laws of lower rule
of law environments fluctuate, and firms may very well have
occasion to lobby.o' But firms in low rule of law countries often
will find greater advantage in preserving the law as they find it,
irrespective of the law's particular content.106
Porter accounts for the law similarly-as a constraint,'0 7 a
driver or suppressor of demand, 08 an enabler or inhibitor of
emerging industries,to an impediment to free trade,"l0 and as a
general influencer of industry competition' and evolution."12
Porter's classic five forces model guides firms in assessing the
attractiveness of a given competitive arena.' 13 But the law's
"attractiveness" is not the appropriate inquiry. The law is a
necessity: firms must compete legally. Porter's model "does not
focus on the important linkages between private strategy and
Similarly, though it is very useful for its
public policy."I'
102 See Downes, supra note 1, at 19 ("[L]aw and regulation increasingly determine
winners and losers. That means company leaders must work more closely with their
legal departments. And they must hire lawyers who know how to use law as a strategic
weapon.").
103 See generally VIJAY SATHE, CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP (2003) (discussing
the traits of successful corporate entrepreneurship such as risk management, adapting
lessons from individual entrepreneurship, and consistently pursuing new businesses).
104 See Bailey, supra note 67, at 77 (advocating for businesses to shape public
policy to their advantage).
105 See generally, e.g., ScoTT KENNEDY, THE BUSINESS OF LOBBYING IN CHINA
(2005) (discussing the complexities of lobbying for and against regulations in China due
to the tension between privately-owned and state-owned firms).
106 See infra Part IV.C.3.
107 See, e.g., MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 53 (2004).
108 Id. at 166.

109 Id. at 223-24.
110 Id.at 286.
Il'

Id. at 28.

Id. at 181-82.
113 George S. Day, Assessing Competitive Arenas: Who Are Your Competitors?, in
WHARTON ON DYNAMIC COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 23, 33-42 (George S. Day & David J.
Reibstein eds., 1997).
114 Bailey, supra note 67, at 79.
112
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purpose, "the resource-based view of the firm[] also treats public
policy only indirectly."" 5
International firms require a framework cognizant of
institutional differences-a framework best captured by the "rule

of law.""16
E. The Law's Core Tensions: Certainty versus Flexibility
andRules versus Discretion
Since at least Aristotle's time, humans have recognized the
inherent tension between stability and flexibility in the law, and
the need for balance between these."' Such a balance "is the
problem of the ages.""' As Roscoe Pound eloquently observed,
"[1]aw must be stable, yet it cannot stand still."'1 Discretion must
be built into the rules if the legal system is to be effective, 2 0 but
balancing the two is difficult.121 State officials might exercise
discretion for several reasons: rules can be difficult to formulate,
discretion is sometimes preferable to the rules that could be
promulgated, and some discretion admittedly ought to be
constrained but is not, owing to institutional imperfections.12 2 In
authoritarian environments, an additional fact is at work: legal
flexibilities are helpful in preserving the privileged status of
political incumbents, 2 3 for "[o]rganizations will be designed to
115
116

Id.
See infra Part III (detailing a rule of law framework).

117

BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 2 (1924).

118

Id. at 3.

S19 ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1967).

120 See CARDOZO, supra note 117, at 2.
121 ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 54 (1954)
("Almost all of the problems of jurisprudence come down to a fundamental one of rule
and discretion.").
122

KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 15-21 (1969).

123 See infra Part III.C (discussing lower rule of law states and legal flexibilities).
Mechanisms for replacing inefficient institutions are seldom found in practice.
PEJOVICH, supra note 45, at 35. One explanation is the "self-interest of the political
elite ... . To preserve their positions and status, members of the political elite have
incentives to create rent-seeking opportunities for a segment of the community that
might, in turn, support the prevailing regime." Id. at 36. Thus, "[t]he further a country
travels away from the rule of law the greater the power of the ruling group to create
institutions that strengthen and perpetuate its own powers." Id. at 39. But even
authoritarians must be minimally effective. John Morison, How to Change Things with
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further the objectives of their creators."l2 4
From the state's perspective as well, both predictability and
flexibility in the law are needed. The "rights hypothesis" asserts
that "economic growth requires a legal order offering stable and
predictable rights of property and contract because the absence of
such rights discourages investment and specialization." 25 For all
states desirous of meaningful economic growth, the legal system
must incentivize private actors. 126 And yet a perfectly predictable,
entirely inflexible legal system would be ineffective due to either
infinite complexity (to unambiguously cover all possible
contingencies) or woeful inadequacy (in seeking simplicity, the
law would neglect a vast range of contingencies and would rely
upon arbitrariness-standards outside of the law-to fill the gaps).
Again, the debate concerns where the optimal balance lies.127
"Rules may vary [by] degree of specificity or precision; extent,
coverage, or inclusiveness; accessibility and intelligibility, legal
status and force; and the prescriptions or sanctions they

incorporate,l

28

"[S]ome unpredictability in law is desirable," argue Altschuler
and Sgori.12 9 "Indeed, if a rule had to provide an automatic and
completely predictable outcome before courts could resolve
conflicts, society would become intolerably repressive, if not
altogether impossible.""o People would have little incentive to
participate in the legal process, and the "needs of society change
over time. The words of [the] law . . . must take on new meanings.
Rules, in LAW, SOCIETY AND CHANGE 5, 5 (Stephen Livingstone & John Morison eds.,

1990) (noting that "law has to be made to work" in order for incumbents to sustain their
positions of power).
124

DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC

PERFORMANCE 73 (1990).
125 Donald C. Clarke, Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The

China Problem, 51 AM. J. COMp. L. 89, 89 (2003).
126 See id.

127 Raz, supra note 6, at 6 (arguing that the key balance is between generality and
specificity in the laws).
128 BALDWIN & CAVE, supra note 39, at 101. For a thought-provoking discussion
of what rules are, see generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE THEORY OF RULES (Frederick

Schauer ed., 2011).
129

BRUCE E. ALTSCHULER & CELIA A. SGORI, UNDERSTANDING LAW INA CHANGING

SOCIETY 150, 150 (2d ed. 1996).
130

Id
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The participation that ambiguity encourages constantly bombards
judges with new ideas."l 3 ' Lawmakers should not deliberately
create legal uncertainties, as sometimes happens in lower rule of
law jurisdictions.132
Instead, while "uncertainty in law is
unavoidable," it is "more a blessing than a curse."l 33
Skeptics note that legal ambiguities can disincentivize
business.134 "[E]x post discretion is problematical for dealYet it remains nearly impossible to eliminate
making."' 5
discretion "either because it is hopeless to nail down every
margin ... or because of difficulties in monitoring performance.
For either reason, anticipation of exercises of discretion may cause
[business] deals to be stillborn." 36 "Uncertainty [in international
business] is due largely to the unpredictable manner in which
government agencies ... interpret and enforce regulations."' 37
Informal institutions, such as the firm's reputation, can become a
substitute basis for doing business, since a "reputation for
honoring one's commitments enhances the prospects for gains
from subsequent deals."' 3 8
In any jurisdiction, legal uncertainties generate some degree of
administrative discretion.139 For some scholars, bureaucratic
discretion "endangers the . .. rule of law."' 40 Many commentators
agree that the rule of law requires government "limited by laws
that are clear and specific." 4 ' Yet bureaucratic discretion is "an
131 Id. at 151.
132 See infra Part III.C (noting that some lower rule of law jurisdictions deliberately
incorporate flexibilities into their legal systems).
133 ALTSCHULER & SGORI, supra note 129, at 151.
134 See, e.g., Clarke supra note 125, at 89 ("[T]he absence of [a predictable legal

order] discourages investment and specialization.").
135 Kenneth A. Shepsle, PoliticalDeals in InstitutionalSettings, in THE THEORY OF
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 219, 229 (Robert E. Goodwin ed., 1996).
136

Id

137

Mann, supra note 54, at 18.

138

Shepsle, supra note 135, at 229.

139

LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES 3 (2010); GARY C. BRYNER,

BUREAUCRATICDISCRETION 1 (1987).

140 BRYNER, 139 note 139, at 2; accord FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO

SERFDOM 72 (1944) (providing that government must be bound by rules previously
announced); DAVIS, supra note 122, at 28-36 (same). But see Raz, supra note 6, at 12

(arguing that "[m]any forms of arbitrary rule are compatible with the rule of law").
141 BRYNER, supra note 139, at 8.
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inevitable, inescapable characteristic of government."l 4 2 Two
basic types of bureaucratic discretion exist: the authority to make
legislative-like policy decisions, and the authority to decide how
general policies apply to specific cases.143 "Decisions according to
rules run in predictable, straight paths. Discretionary decisions
invoke an image of unpredictable tangents."l4 4 Many proponents
of legal certainty concede that some degree of official discretion is
beneficial.145 Still, the value of institutions is measured by the
degree of stability they engender.14 6 Unstable rules "tend to
increase ... risk and uncertainty." 47 Yet stability requires some
flexibility, for "societal stability depends on how quickly a legal
system can adapt to ... unstoppable social change." 48
In practice, the distinction between rules and discretion is
difficult to maintain.149 This is partly because the "power to
decide [legal questions] becomes the power to define" what is
lawful.5 0 Managers sometimes think that "the world is either
certain, and therefore open to precise predictions ... or uncertain,
and therefore completely unpredictable.""' This is errant because
uncertainty exists in degrees. 5 2 High rule of law jurisdictions
promote sufficient predictability in tandem with some degree of
legal flexibility.'53
142
143

Id. at 3.
Id. at 6.

GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 43 (1996).
For example, delegation to administrative agencies "is held necessary, among
other reasons, because of a presumed need for flexibility, and therefore discretion ....
[A]lmost by definition, regulatory mandates cannot be completely specified." Mitnick,
supra note 65, at 205. Bryner concedes that some degree of official discretion can
benefit society. BRYNER, supra note 139, at 3-6; see also DAVIS, supra note 122, at 3
(providing that discretion may be either reasonable or arbitrary).
146 PEJOVICH, supra note 45, at 25.
147 Id.
148 Silverstein & Hohler, supra note 9, at 799.
149 See FLETCHER, supra note 144, at 43-59 (discussing the relationship between
rules and discretion).
150 Id. at 51.
151 Hugh Courtney, Jane Kirkland & Patrick Viguerie, Strategy Under Uncertainty,
in HARv. Bus. REV. ON MANAGING UNCERTAINTY 1, 3 (1999).
152 See id at 5 ("[D]etermining which strategy is best ... depend[s] vitally on the
level of uncertainty a company faces.").
153 SOLAN, supra note 139, at 16-17. "The fact that [Americans] agree so often
144
145
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Part III will argue that the extent to which uncertainties
pervade a legal system is described by the "rule of law," and that
differing degrees of rule of law observation imply different legal

strategies for the firm.15 4
F. Transaction Costs, the Coase Theorem, and the Law
Transaction costs and the Coase Theorem are important to our
subject. "Transaction costs" are "the costs of identifying the
parties with whom one has to bargain, the costs of getting together
with them, the costs of the bargaining process itself, and the costs
of enforcing any bargain reached"'" -in other words, "the price of
doing a deal."' 56 Six types of transaction cost are recognized:
search, information, bargaining, decision, policing, and
enforcement costs. 5 7
efficiency. 5 1
Transaction costs undermine economic
Uncertainty propagates risk and discourages transactions.15
Unclear regulations cause economic actors to invest more time
lobbying, and because this is a less productive investment than
direct economic activity, jurisdictions with ambiguous laws
Thus, legal
typically stultify their own economic potential.'
flexibility is a seventh source of transaction costs. Some scholars

about a law's application rightly gives us confidence in our ability to live under a rule of
law that defines our rights and obligations." Id. at 18.
154 See infra Part III.
155 A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 12 (2d ed.
1989). But see Douglas W. Allen, Transaction Costs, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 893, 893 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (asserting

that the phrase "transaction cost" has evolved to the point that its meaning is potentially
ambiguous).
156 LARRY DOWNES, THE LAWS OF DISRUPTION 35 (2009); accord PEJOVICH, supra

note 45, at 9 (stating that transaction costs are the resources firms spend to make
exchanges as well as resources society expends to maintain institutions).
157 DOWNES, supra note 156, at 36. Unfortunately, transaction costs are also
common. Id. at 37 (noting "that up to 45 percent of economic activity consists of

transaction costs").
158 Id. at 36.
159 Frans van Waarden, Institutions and Innovation: The Legal Environment of
InnovatingFirms, 22 ORG. STUD. 765, 768 (2001).
160 Susan E. Feinberg & Anil K. Gupta, MNC Subsidiaries and Country Risk:

Internalizationas a Safeguard Against Weak External Institutions, 52 ACAD. MGMT. J.
381, 382-83 (2009).
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opine that Western jurisdictions "have too many laws and too
many rules such that a reasonable person can be observed
acting . .. wholly unreasonabl[y] ....

16

Unclear laws are bad

from the societal perspective because "[w]ithout a legal regime
specifying who owns what and a system for transferring rights, the
market could not operate."l 6 2 Properly devised, however, the law
can lower transaction costs. 163
Efficient institutions reduce transaction costs by supplying
effective rules. In places where "the law and informal norms
govern exchange relationships, transaction costs are relatively
low ....
By comparison, in environments in which institutions
are underdeveloped, transaction costs are high, [and] exchange is
therefore costly. ... "" In other words, institutions "represent
constraints on the options that individuals and collectives are
likely to exercise, albeit constraints that are open to modification
over time."1 65 Legal constraints are subject to modification over
time and can hold differing implications for individual firms. This
fact is responsible for the law's potential as a source of
competitive advantage. Yet institutions can themselves become

sources of uncertainty.166
This leads to the Coase Theorem, an idea that has been
expressed in many ways.' 6 7 The simplest version states that "[i]f
there are zero transaction costs, the efficient outcome [of a
bargain] will occur regardless of the choice of legal rule."'6 In the
161 PATRICK A. McNurr, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAW 4 (2010).

162 FLETCHER, supra note 144, at 157; accord Nicholas Dew, Institutional
Entrepreneurship:A CoasianPerspective, 7 INT'L J. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & INNOVATION

13, 15 (2006) (asserting that institutions establish incentives).
163 SATHE, supra note 103, at 47-48 (stating that government regulations can both
hinder and facilitate new business creation).
164 Dew, supra note 162, 14-15.
165 Stephen R. Barley & Pamela S. Tolbert, Institutionalizationand Structuration:
Studying the Links Between Action and Institution, 18 ORG. STUD. 93, 94 (1997).
166 See generally van Waarden, supra note 159 (contrasting the United States and
Dutch legal systems and concluding that the U.S. system's penchant for emphasizing
litigation functions as an institutional source of uncertainty).
167 Steven G. Medema & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr., The Coase Theorem, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 836, 837-38 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De

Geest eds., 2000).
168 POLINSKY, supra note 155, at 12; accordYORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 7 (2d ed. 1997).
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real world, however, transaction costs always exist to one degree
or another.'6 9 Thus, the Theorem's more nuanced version holds
that "[i]f there are positive transaction costs, the efficient outcome
may not occur under every legal rule."' 7 0 The Normative Coase
Theorem"' extends this still further: "the preferred legal rule is
the rule that minimizes the effects of transaction costs. These
effects include actually incurring transaction costs as well as the
inefficient choices induced by a desire to avoid transaction
costs."' 7 2 As Downes explains:
Coase believed economists should turn their attention to the
practical problem of uncovering [and eliminating transaction
costs] .

. .

. A great deal of regulation and liability laws . . . were

unconscious efforts to overcome transaction costs . . .. But the

regulations themselves generate so many transaction costs that
in many cases doing nothing at all would have produced a [more
efficient] result.'7
In other words, "Coase argued that, from an economic perspective,
the goal of the legal system should be to establish a pattern of
rights such that economic efficiency is attained. The legal system
affects transaction[] costs and the goal of such a system is to

minimize harm or costs."

74

169 POLINSKY, supra note 155, at 12; accord PEJOVICH, supra note 45, at 12
(providing that the real world "is not a Coasian world ....
The relevant choice is

between two or more discrete institutional arrangements with positive transaction
costs"); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 95 (5th ed. 2008)

(asserting that because transaction costs always exist in practice, legal rules influence
whether efficient outcomes are achieved).
170

POLINSKY, supra note 155, at 13.

171 Scholars debate whether the Coase Theorem contains a normative element, or
whether it is purely descriptive. See, e.g., Medema & Zerbe, supra note 167, at 876
(stating that the Coase Theorem is a positive statement with no normative implications);
Joseph Farrell, Information and the Coase Theorem, 1 ECON. PERSP. 113, 113-14 (1987)
(noting this debate among economists).
172
173

POLINSKY, supra note 155, at 13.
DOWNES, supra note 156, at 37.

174 Medema & Zerbe, supra note 167, at 836-37; see also David B. Sherman, Cost
and Resource Allocation Under the Orphan Works Act of 2006: Would the Act Reduce
Transaction Costs, Allocate Orphan Works Efficiently, andServe the Goals of Copyright
Law?, 12 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 7 (2007) (asserting that property laws ought to minimize
transaction costs); SVETOZAR PEJOVICH, LAW, INFORMAL RULES AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 15 (2008) (asserting that clearly defined property rights are crucial to

resolving conflicts).

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

356

Vol. XXXIX

In turn, this aspiration requires that rights be defined "well."
"Well-defined rights" are articulated in such a manner that
everyone can understand them-that is, rights defined
unambiguously.176 Ambiguous laws generate transaction Costs.1
Property rights can lower transaction costs ifthey are defined with
clarity."' "Lowering transaction costs 'lubricates' bargaining ....
One important way for the law to do this is by defining simple and
clear property rights. It is easier to bargain when legal rights are
simple and clear than when they are complicated and uncertain."l79
Observers outside of economics agree that lawmakers "should use
language that is clear, certain, unequivocal, and to the point."'" In
this paper, the "Coasian ideal" refers to the idealized situation in
which the law imposes no transaction costs upon society because it
is perfectly clear and perfectly functioning.
Llewellyn felt that even in the American legal system, "the
leeway available for exploitation by advocates . .. is a wide
leeway."'"'
For Llewellyn, legal flexibilities are problematic
because they are inconsistent with the Coasian ideal. But firms
need not passively accept the costs generated by institutional
peculiarities. Rather, as with any other social institution, the firm
must seek to utilize the law for its benefit, subject to ethical
confines. Leeways in the law are not ethically dubious per se, just
as market opportunities to outperform rivals are not evil. To the
extent a legal system invites competition through its flexibilities,
the law is a legitimate arena for entrepreneurial initiative.

175 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 169, at 97 (stating that one should "[s]tructure the
law so as to remove the impediments to private agreements"); Avery Katz, The Strategic
Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation,
89 MICH. L. REv. 215, 228-29 (1990) (same).
176 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 169, at 97; Sanford Schane, Ambiguity and
Misunderstandingin the Law, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 167, 170 (2002).
177 See Feinberg & Gupta, supra note 160, at 382.

178 Thomas Hazlett, Ronald H. Coase, in PIONEERS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 17

(Lloyd R. Cohen & Joshua D. Wright eds., 2009).
179 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 169, at 97.
180 Schane, supra note 176, at 170.
181

LLEWELLYN, supra note 128, at 122.
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G. The Cross-BorderFirm: General Considerations
1. The InternationalEnvironment
Global business is uniquely challenging because of the number
and complexity of variables involved, greater volatility across
countries, and higher degrees of interdependence.' 8 2 Still, firms
confront many compelling reasons in favor of globalizing. These
include the growth, efficiency and knowledge imperatives, and the
globalization of one's customers and competitors."' Globalization
will remain a core feature of business.'84 The survival of most
large enterprises will depend upon their effectiveness in foreign
environments, including foreign legal systems.'"' Yet global
presence does not automatically make for global competitive
advantage.' 86 Because many emerging countries "are open to
foreign investors but do not follow orthodox market rules,"'8 7
Western firms must expressly account for foreign legal systems in
their strategic planning."
2. Risks
Firms must proactively manage their international risks'8 9 and
so must be familiar with the localities in which they operate (or
intend to operate).' 9 0 Several forms of risk merit attention. Legal
risk is the most relevant. Western scholars usually define the idea

182 Clarence J. Mann, Strategy in a Global Context, in BORDERLESS BUSINESS 33,
34 (Clarence J. Mann & Klaus Gotz eds., 2006).
183 ANIL K. GUPTA, VIJAY GOVINDARAJAN & HAIYAN WANG, THE QUEST FOR
GLOBAL DOMINANCE: TRANSFORMING GLOBAL PRESENCE INTO GLOBAL COMPETITIVE

28-29 (2d ed. 2008).
Id. at 15-17 (supporting this assertion with numerous examples of how global
lines are now well entrenched).
185 DANIELS, RADEBAUGH & SULLIVAN, supra note 71, at 116-18 (observing that
firms confront myriad legal issues abroad).
186 GUPTA, GOVINDARAJAN & WANG, supra note 183, at 21.
ADVANTAGE
184

187

RUCHIR SHARMA, BREAKOUT NATIONS: IN PURSUIT OF THE NEXT ECONOMIC

187 (2012).
See generally infra Parts III and IV.
Peter Lorange, Challenges to Strategic Planning Processes in Multinational

MIRACLES
188
189

Corporations, in INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

107, 112-14 (Anant R.

Negandhi & Arun Savara eds., 1989) (discussing international risk management).
190

Id. at 113.
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without regard to institutions.' 9 1 For example, they view legal risk
in terms of litigation' 92 or as "the likelihood that a trading partner
will opportunistically break a contract or expropriate property
rights."' 93 Broadly, then, "legal risk" is the likelihood that a firm
will suffer financial harm from a legal process or the lack
thereof.'94 But our context specifically concerns international
firms in foreign markets. For purposes of this article, legal risk
describes the likelihood that a firm will suffer losses' 95 that it
otherwise could avoid but for one or more uncertainties or
flexibilities in a particular legal system.' 96 Significantly, affluent
countries tend to regulate business less, and impoverished
countries tend to regulate more.' 97 This is a fact of great
importance as the firm moves from a single, institutionally strong
environment to the cross-jurisdictional realm.' 98
Politicalrisk "refers to the threat that decisions or events in a
country will negatively affect the profitability of an investment."l99
Assessing political risk requires an evaluation of the government's
role, the type of government, social strife, and other related
variables.20 0
Political risks range from relatively minor
occurrences to catastrophic events.2 0'
Political risk is a major consideration in foreign investment,

191 See generally Tobias Mahler, Defining Legal Risk, http://ssm.com/abstract
=1014364 (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) (listing various definitions).
192 See Kevin Johnson & Zane Swanson, Quantifying Legal Risk: A Method for
Managing Legal Risk, 9 MGMT. ACCT. Q. 22 (2007).

193 CHARLES W.L. HILL, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 93 (9th ed. 2013).
194 See SHOUSHANG

LI,

THE LEGAL

ENVIRONMENT AND

RISKS FOR FOREIGN

INVESTMENT INCHINA 3 (2007).

195 "Losses" include direct financial losses as well as lost opportunities and the like.
196 These include legal ambiguity and incompleteness as well as changes to the law.
LI, supra note 194, at 3-4.
197 DANIELS, RADEBAUGH & SULLIVAN, supra note 71, at 118.
198 This article will again consider legal risk in Part IV.C, infra.
199 DANIELS, RADEBAUGH & SULLIVAN, supra note 71, at 106; see also Stephen J.
Kobrin, Political Risk: A Review and Reconsideration, 10 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 67, 68

(1979) (reviewing various definitions of political risk).
200 Syed H. Akhter & Roberto Friedman, InternationalMarket Entry Strategies and
Level

of Involvement

in

Marketing Activities,

in

INTERNATIONAL

MANAGEMENT 157, 164-66 (Anant R. Negandhi & Arun Savara eds., 1989).
201

DANIELS, RADEBAUGH & SULLIVAN, supra note 71, at 107-09.
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but few firms have formal mechanisms for assessing it.202 Political
A political risk may be
risk is difficult to quantify.20 3
characterized by certainty, risk, or uncertainty.20 4 These are ideal
constructs.205 Any of the three can be approximated in practice,2 06
so "while better information can help" to clarify political
variables, information "can seldom convert uncertainty into
Opinions formed about future events ... are
[lower] risk ....
inherently subjective." 20 7 Firms should analyze political risks
through a "systematic and relatively rigorous approach to data
gathering and problem solving." 208 Quantitative modeling is
helpful, but qualitative judgment must still guide the assessment of
political risk.209
Many assumptions appropriate in developed economies are
"dangerous" in emerging markets. 2 10 Traditional evaluation tools
"don't flash warning signals to would-be entrants about the
presence of institutional voids." 2 " Institutional voids are "the
absence of specialized intermediaries, regulatory systems, and
In
contract-enforcing mechanisms in emerging markets."2 12
evaluating a foreign political environment, the firm must consider
such factors as the number of groups competing for political
power; the limits, if any, upon government regulation; the extent
to which private property rights are protected; the power of
lobbies; the prevalence of corruption; and the extent to which
Kobrin, supra note 199, at 74.
203 See Tillman Sachs, Robert Tiong & Daniel Wagner, The Quantification and
FinancialImpact of PoliticalRisk Perceptions on Infrastructure Projects in Asia, 13 J.
202

STRUCTURED FINANCE 80, 80-81 (2008).
204

Kobrin, supra note 199, at 70; accord Philip Bromiley, Kent D. Miller &

Devaki Rau, Risk in Strategic Management Research, in THE BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 259, 260 (Michael A. Hitt, R. Edward Freedman & Jeffery S.

Harrison eds., 2001) (defining "certainty," "risk," and "uncertainty" in a similar fashion).
205 Kobrin, supra note 199, at 70.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 71.
208 Id.at 77.
209 Id. at 76.
210 Tarun Khanna, Krishna G. Palepu & Jayant Sinha, Strategies That FitEmerging
Markets, 83 HARV. Bus. REv. 63, 65 (2005).
211

Id at 65-66.

212

Id. at 63;

TARUN KHANNA & KRISHNA G. PALEPU, WINNING IN EMERGING

MARKETS 14 (2010).
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contracts are honored.2 13
Finally, jurisdictions vary by country risk-hazardsoriginating
"from
unpredictability
regarding
the
substance
and
implementation of future government policies, the extent to which
a country is governed by rule of law ... and so forth. . . ."214 As
an amalgam of cultural, political, and legal risks,2 15 country risk
can be treated discretely in evaluating a market's attractiveness.2 16
Legal, political, and country risks advance a similar idea: nonmarket forces can exercise dramatic-even deterministicinfluences on the firm's economic performance. This idea is
expressed in institutional economics: institutions hold profound
implications for the firm's risks, costs, and opportunities, and
therefore ought to influence the firm's strategy.217 But firms often
fail to account for institutional variables, and managers often view
the law only as a burdensome constraint.2 18 Parts III and IV, infra,
propose a starting point for the integration of law and strategy.
3. Costs
Risks necessarily impose costs upon the firm. Clearly, laws
impose financial costs. Yet the law's effective integration with
strategy is as much an institutional endeavor as an economic one.
To this end, the "pattern of ownership that emerges in an
[international business] system depends crucially on the structure
of transaction costs." 2 19 In particular, "international linkages
typically incur higher transaction costs than purely domestic

213 Khanna, Palepu & Sinha, supra note 210, at 68.
214 Feinberg & Gupta, supra note 160, at 382.
215 See HILL, supra note 193, at 93 (asserting that country attractiveness "depends
on balancing the benefits, costs, and risks associated with doing business in that
country").
216 GEORGE S. Yip & G. THOMAS M. HULT, TOTAL GLOBAL STRATEGY 257 (3d ed.

2012).
217

See Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV.

841, 846 n.86 (1999) ("[N]ew institutional economics also explores how norms develop
and operate within the institution and how various norms-for example, norms of
cooperation-influence the institutional environment, the firm's internal structure, and
consequently its economic decisionmaking.").
218 See generally infra Parts III and IV.
219 Peter Buckley & Mark Casson, Strategic Complexity in InternationalBusiness,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 88, 118 (2003).
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ones." 220
Significantly, "[t]ransactions vary in difficulty. It is generally
easier to transact in developed than in developing markets." 2 2 1
This is largely due to transaction costs, which "offer one measure
of how well a market works .... Conducting even simple
transactions in developing economies can be a time- and resourceconsuming process, posing hazards for those expecting the fluidity
of developed markets."22 2
Regulatory compliance imposes upon the firm direct costs as
well as indirect costs (the time allocated to compliance).22 3 Every
"legal system is based on social and cultural institutions. These
institutions differ across jurisdictions, creating differences in the
cost of doing business."2 24 Still, in appraising the law's potential
as a source of competitive advantage, the firm must also consider
its potential returns. Western executives tend to think they have
received a high return on legal costs if they "stay out of
trouble." 225 But in low rule of law environments, the potential
returns can be far greater.
Chinloy remarked that "[a]ll firms must comply with the legal
system" and that "[s]ome firms are more efficient at
compliance." 2 26 This article does not dispute the necessity of
compliance, but notes that legally flexible environments typically
introduce the likelihood that legal compliance is itself subject to
high degrees of flexibility. In the presence of legal flexibility,
compliance with the law can assume myriad legitimate forms.227
Legal costs can thus be highly malleable.22 8

220

Id

221

KHANNA & PALEPU, supra note 212, at 16.

222

Id. at 17.

223

CH[NLOY, supra note 63, at 22.
224 Id. at 103.
225 See generally Randy Decker, Economics and Litigation: View from the Inside
Looking Out, 24 LITIG. 36, 36 (1998) ("[M]ost executives view litigation as wasteful ...
[and] extremely expensive.").
226 CHINLOY, supra note 63, at 1
227

Id. at 2 (listing litigation and regulation as two examples).

228

Id. at 3.
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4. Opportunities
For nearly every risk emanating from a legal flexibility, a
corresponding opportunity for value capture is also created.2 29
These opportunities often are subtle-perhaps initially almost
undetectable, as evidence of their existence can be convoluted and
counterintuitive. But these opportunities are nonetheless present.
Some scholars have argued that firms can advantageously
exploit institutional voids 230 and that "[i]nstitutional voids have
real and first-order effects on business strategy." 231 Khanna and
Palepu note that "[t]he development of business strategy in any
economy is driven by three primary markets-product, labor, and
capital." 23 2 Arguably, however, the legal market is as strategically
important as the traditional markets.
The law can be utilized to the benefit of regulated parties,
regulators, or both.233 International firms may confront higher
average risks and costs than their domestic counterparts, but global
firms almost invariably encounter greater opportunities as well.
Emerging markets "foster a different genre of innovations than
mature markets do." 234 This is as true of the legal sphere as it is of
the economic sphere.
Foreign firms often resist policy hazards by lobbying or by
minimizing the firm's dependence upon the external
environment. 23 5 "[D]eploying political strategies requires . . .
interpreting an external environment and acting upon that
interpretation. Also, success with political strategies requires the
cooperation of external actors over whom a firm may have little
control."236 Moreover, "naYve deployment of political strategies
Some scholars have recognized this in the regulatory context. See BALDWIN &
CAVE, supra note 39, at 2 (noting that regulation can be enabling or facilitative); see also
infra Parts 11-IV (discussing legal opportunities).
230 See generally, e.g., KHANNA & PALEPU, supra note 212 (noting that companies
can view institutional voids as entrepreneurial opportunities).
231 Id. at 28.
232 Id. at 27.
233 ROGER D. MASTERS, THE NATURE OF POLITics 205 (1989) (asserting that private
interests will manipulate rules for their own benefit, leading to greater complexity in the
law); see also supra Part II.C (discussing sources on point).
234 Khanna, Palepu & Sinha, supra note 210, at 64.
235 Feinberg & Gupta, supra note 160, at 383-84.
236 Id. at 385.
229
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In short, like other complex activities, the
effective deployment of political strategies is likely to be subject
to significant experience effects."237 Part IV will argue that firms
enjoy a third option in addition to political and operational
strategies: legal entrepreneurship.
The opportunity for arbitrage may also exist in the law.
Classical arbitrage exploits price differentials, but arbitrage exists
in other forms as well.238 Firms can use Ghemawat's CAGE
framework to understand the full gambit of opportunities for
arbitrage.
The four dimensions of "CAGE"-cultural,
administrative, geographical, and economic differences between
countries-can function as sources of advantage.239
The
administrative dimension is of interest here: "[1]egal,
institutional[,] and political differences from country to country
open up a host of strategic arbitrage opportunities."2 40 Ghemewat
notes that "[flew managers ever explicitly treat tax or other
administrative arbitrages as a strategic tool, despite their potential.
That's partly because executives are reluctant to draw attention to
such arrangements for fear that they might be outlawed." 241 Of
course, "[i]n some cases, administrative arbitrageurs are actually
breaking the law." 24 2 This article does not propose that the firm
should deliberately break the law. 2 43 The framework here is based
on a far simpler truth: the law's meaning can fluctuate even when
can easily backfire.

its language does not.2 4 4
5. Managersand Lawyers
Lawyers are trained to be "risk-averse"-to recommend the

action least likely to expose the client to legal risks.245
237

In the

Id.
Pankaj Ghemawat, The Forgotten Strategy, in HARV. Bus. REV. ON DOING
BUSINESS IN CHINA 163, 167 (2004).
239 Id at 168.
240 Id. at 170.
241 Id. at 171.
242 Id.
243 See supra Part I (confining this article's reach to legitimate activities).
244 See infra Part III.C.1 (discussing substantive legal flexibilities).
245 See Richard Kaplan, Toward Better Communications Between Executives and
Lawyers, UTAH B.J. 18, 18 (2011) (providing that "some lawyers really are or do come
off as... risk averse"); see also Lawrence Rosenburg, Lawyers' Poker: Using the
238
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presence of ambiguity, this bias often motivates the attorney to
recommend inaction.2 46 Avoiding risk is not always wrong, but
always avoiding risk needlessly cedes immense value to one's
rivals.247 Risks may impose costs, yet there is a terrible cost to the
excessive avoidance of risk.248
Managers tend to act "and let the lawyers sort [things] out
later."249 Managers thus perceive that "[a]t any moment the law
can shut anything down, and we can't afford to be shut down."250
The views of managers and regulators can also diverge, which
"can lead to unpleasant shocks for managers...."251
Because managers and attorneys view the world so differently,
few firms have considered what "legal strategy" means. 25 2 The
few who have apply two complimentary approaches: (1) "the
managerial approach is aimed at determining which legal choices
are the most efficient to improve the performance of the firm;" and
(2) "the normative approach is aimed at improving the
comprehension of the origin of legal strategies in order to detect
the existing legal opportunities." 2 53 Executives and attorneys can
find common ground by forging a common understanding of
strategic opportunity in the law. Part III explores this realm of
opportunity.

Lessons of Poker to Win Litigation, 54 THE ADVOCATE 10, 10 (2011) (asserting that
lawyers are risk-averse).
246 See Rosenburg, supra note 245, at 10 (asserting that "the thought of losing at all
is often enough to keep [a lawyer] from taking a risk").
247 Cf id. (providing that a lawyer should "be aware of ... bias" in favor of
avoiding risks and "exploit bias in others").
248 These are the opportunities foregone to harness the law as competitive
advantage. See infra Parts Ill-IV.
249 GEORGE FRIEDMAN ET AL., THE INTELLIGENCE EDGE 234 (1997).
250 Id.
251 Dennis A. Yao, Antitrust Constraintsto Competitive Strategy, in WHARTON ON
DYNAMIC COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 313, 320 (George S. Day & David J. Reibstein eds.,

1997).
252 Antoine Masson, The Origin of Legal Opportunities, in LEGAL STRATEGIES:
How CORPORATIONS USE LAW TO IMPROVE PERFORMANCE 27, 27 (Antoine Masson &
Mary J. Shariff eds., 2010).
253 Id at 27-28.
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III. A Preliminary Rule of Law Framework: Identifying
Opportunities for Advantage in the Law
"The Rule of Law was consciously evolved only during the
liberal age and is one of its greatest achievements."25 4 Yet
consensus on a single definition of "the rule of law" has never
been achieved.255 This article posits that the "rule of law" reflects
the law's potential as a source of competitive advantage in each
jurisdiction. As noted earlier, however, virtually all literature on
point limits its reach to the world's few highly refined legal
systems by assuming the presence of advanced institutions.25 6
Thus, the objective of Part III is to define the "rule of law" in a
manner useful to international firms.
A. Competing Conceptions of the Rule ofLaw
Many definitions of the "rule of law" exist. 257 "The content of
the term ... remains contested across both time and geography." 2 5 8
Popular definitions embody three core ideas: government limited
by law, formal legality, and the absence of arbitrariness.25 9
Black's Law Dictionary is typical, defining the rule of law as
"[t]he supremacy of regular as opposed to arbitrary power; [t]he

254 HAYEK, supra note 140, at 81-82.
255 Academically, this is not entirely bad; "[i]n part, it is this flexibility-even
ambiguity-of rule of law that makes it a fascinating topic of research." Nelson &
Cabatingan, supra note 5, at 3. But the framework here seeks practical solutions to the
questions of legal competitive advantage.
256 See supra Part II.D.
257 Rather than reciting these voluminous definitions here, we recommend JOHN W.
HEAD, CHINA'S LEGAL SOUL 149-61 (2008) (listing numerous definitions) and MICHAEL
J. TREBILCOCK & RONALD J. DANIELS, RULE OF LAW REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT 12-37

(2008) (discussing several definitions).
258 Simon Chesterman, An InternationalRule ofLaw?, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 331, 340
(2008). Virtually all governments and political ideologies endorse the "rule of law" but
can do so only because no consensus on its meaning exists. Id at 332; accord
TREBILCOCK & DANIELS, supra note 257, at 13 (stating that "the rule of law means

whatever one wants it to mean").
259 TAMANAHA, supra note 7, at 114-26; accord MICHAEL A. SANTORO, CHINA 2020
101 (2009) (equating the rule of law with "impersonal, neutrally applied rules" and "the
emergence of human rights and democratic government"); Chesterman, supra note 258,
at 342 (arguing that the rule of law's core features are the restraint of government
arbitrariness, the applicability of the law to "the sovereign and instruments of the state,"
and equal application of the laws).
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doctrine that every person is subject to the ordinary law within the
jurisdiction."2 60 Courts in the United States have taken a similar
view.

161

Many scholars argue that the "rule of law" must account for
more than formal legality; otherwise, it is not a discrete idea apart
from "legal rules."262 Some view the rule of law from the
economic perspective-for example, as a situation in which
governments announce all rules publicly and ahead of time, such
that businesses know which activities are legal and the extent to
which government will enforce contract and property rights.263
Under this view, the rule of law is "a catalyst of economic
development." 2 64
A few organizations have proposed
quantifications of the rule of law that trend in this direction.265
These definitions can be helpful depending upon one's need.
Some are relevant to business on the broadest levels. The
economic view, for example, surmises that the law must
sufficiently incentivize actors before substantial economic activity
can occur. 2 6 6 But these definitions tend not to inform the
260

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1448 (9th ed. 2009).

261 The United States Supreme Court long ago reasoned, "[n]o man in this country
is so high that he is above the law" and that the courts exist in part to defend citizens'
rights from undue government incursion. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220-21, 1
S. Ct. 240, 261, 27 L. Ed. 171, 182 (1882). Other courts have emphasized equality, e.g.,
Blue v. United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525, 534 (4th Cir. 1990); the three coequal branches of government, e.g., Morgan v. Principi, 327 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
2003); and the role of the courts in upholding the rule of law, e.g., Walker v. Bain, 257
F.3d 660, 677 (6th Cir. 2001).
262

E.g., TAMANAHA, supra note 7, at 96-97.

263 Michael Risch, Virtual Rule ofLaw, 112 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (2009).
264

Id. at 2.

265 Two major quantitative models of the rule of law exist: those of the World Bank
and the World Justice Project. The World Bank model captures "perceptions of the
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society" through
figures such as crime rates. See World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators,
WORLDBANK, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#faq-2 (last visited
Oct. 28, 2013). The World Justice Project defines the rule of law as a system in which
(1) government is accountable under law, (2) laws are clear, stable, public, and "fair," (3)
the legal process is transparent and fair, and (4) justice is delivered by competent and
neutral professionals.
See World Justice Project, What is the Rule of Law?,
WORLDJUSTICEPROJECT, http://worldjusticeproject.org/what-rule-law (last visited Oct.
28, 2013).
266 In this way, many economic definitions of "rule of law" tangentially embody the
Coasian ideal.

2014

COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP

367

individual firm's perspective. Most existing definitions neglect
the role of institutions, do not describe the rule of law as a process,
and do not sufficiently consider the legal apparatus in context.267
The definition of an idea this complex cannot be too detailed; no
definition alone will function as a blueprint for business planning.
Yet a definition more attuned to individual firms can surely be
formed.
The existing definitions are normative modelsaspirational versions of the ideal rule of law, against which
political and legal systems might be measured. 268 But these
definitions are not guides for individual firms. The next section
considers the nature of the rule of law, and what this idea
embodies relative to individual firms.
B. The Nature of the Rule ofLaw: Setting the Legal System
in Context
The rule of law cannot be understood apart from its context.269
Most existing conceptions of the rule of law describe an idealized
legal system, weighing the necessity and value of various
ingredients, such as constitutions and due process. 270 These
conceptions are useful for some purposes, but the model proposed
here seeks a practical interpretation of the rule of law. Only a
practical, business-oriented understanding of this idea will reveal
how the international firm best strategically utilizes the legal
realities that it confronts.27 1
McNuTT, supra note 161, at 1.
268 Rogelio Perez-Perdomo, Rule of Law and Lawyers in Latin America, 603
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 179, 180 (2006).
269 "Law cannot be understood unless we put law in context. . . ." McNuTT, supra
note 161, at 1; accord FRED W. RIGGS, ADMINISTRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2728 (1964) (observing that "differentiated [social] structures ... scarcely function
autonomously").
270 See Alan Handler, Judicial Jurisprudence, N.J. LAW., Oct. 2000, at 22, 25
(providing that applying the rule of law involves weighing factors "in the balance").
271 The authors are aware of only one scholar who attempts explicitly to ground
legal advantages in the nature of legal systems and their functioning. See generally
Masson, supra note 252 (providing that legal advantages are anchored in the nature of
the legal system). Masson establishes four ideal legal norms-"clear, comprehensible,
realist and considered as known to all." Id. at 28. Deviations from these norms suggest
certain legal strategies. Id. Masson's model is noteworthy, but the model proposed in
this article is fundamentally different. See Part III. The model in this article plots
countries along a spectrum based upon the degree to which the state's institutions
provide guarantees or certainties (constants) for firms. This model identifies different
267
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No jurisdiction boasts a perfectly effective legal apparatus, yet
most states do not live in anarchy. The rule of law must exist in
degrees. Because the legal system is influenced tremendously by
its environment, the rule of law is best perceived as a process that
accounts for these extra-legal forces.272 To fully elucidate the
"rule of law," both the law and the society it purports to govern
must be understood. The task of this section is to describe this
context and process in general terms.
Clarence J. Mann proposes that in every society, three
"overarching realms both complement and stand in tension with
each other," these being the country's economic, cultural, and
political systems.2 73 Mann's work concerns the management of
country-specific risk and treats the legal system as part of the
political system.27 4 Shane's model similarly relies upon these
three major realms, subsuming the legal sphere within the political
realm.27 5 The legal and political spheres will be treated discretely
here, although they largely overlap.276
A jurisdiction's political and legal systems are intimately

fundamental sources of opportunity than Masson's. See id. at 29-30 (discussing soft,
hazy, crazy, and flexible laws). This model contemplates Masson's notions, but legal
opportunities are organized in a fundamentally different manner. See infra Part III.C
(suggesting three basic types of legal flexibility, with flexibilities defining the realm of
opportunities for entrepreneurial activity in the law). Moreover, this model does not
suggest a single strategy for each of the three types of legal flexibility. The formulation
of strategy is more complex, as described in Part IV. Finally, this model is unique in that
it ties together several important and fundamental ideas, some of which have only
recently begun to evolve in the literature: namely, the rule of law, legal competitive
advantage, and legal entrepreneurship. See infra Part IlI.E.
272 See McNurr,supra note 161, at 1; accord RIGGS, supra note 269, at 27-28.
273 Clarence J. Mann, Managing Country Risk, in BORDERLESS BUSINESS 166, 172

(Clarence J. Mann & Klaus Gotz eds., 2006); see generally id. at 166-90 (detailing the
relationships between the political, economic, and cultural realms).
274 Id. at 177 (showing the legal base as part of the political system in Figure 7.7).
275

Scorr SHANE,

A GENERAL THEORY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP

146-60 (2003)

(concluding that the institutional environment consists of the economic environment, the
political environment, and the socio-cultural environment).
276 See, e.g., ROBERT GILPIN, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 25-45 (2001)
(discussing the nature of political economy); RICHARD DIEN WINFIELD, LAW IN CIVIL

SOCIETY 172-73 (1995) (discussing the political dimension of law and noting that "law
receives its ultimate determination" within the "frontier of political justice"); PerezPerdomo, supra note 268, at 180 ("The operation of a political-legal system is closely
related to economic, social, and cultural aspects.").
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intertwined with its economic environment.2 77 Indeed, the entire
field of "political economy" is dedicated to the study of these
relationships.27 8 By virtue of the linkages between law and
economics, state officials charged with "interpreting and enforcing
the

'rules

of

the

game. . .'

are

significant

economy

policymakers."
Political forces largely determine the economic
realm's contours 280 such that "[t]here is a strong synergy between
economic and political institutions."2 8 1
Culture and history undoubtedly influence the legal system. 28 2
The evolutionary interplay between law and custom is "a historical
process of unusual complexity." 283 Socio-cultural forces include
the jurisdiction's culture(s), history, institutions,2 84 private interest
groups, 285 and extra-legal phenomena. 286 Informal social and
cultural institutions impact business as well, particularly at the
outskirts of the law's reach.2 87 Culture is relevant in two important
respects:
culture (1) helps to define which activities are
legitimate, 288 and (2) suggests the average risk-averseness of firms
27 9

277 For a more detailed diagram illustrating the connections between the economic
and political processes, see WOLFGANG KASPER & MANFRED E. STREIT, INSTITUTIONAL

ECONOMics 402 (1998) (Figure 12.1).
278

See generally, e.g., McNUTT, supra note 161 (exploring the political economy

of law).

Stephenson, supra note 73, at 191.
DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL 42-43 (2012).
281 Id. at 81.
282 See generally, e.g., Stanley Diamond, The Rule of Law Versus the Order of
Custom, in THE RULE OF LAW 115 (Robert Paul Wolff ed., 1971) (providing that "the
customary and the legal orders are historically . . . related").
283 Id. at 120.
284 This includes the historical development and path dependency theories.
285 Private interest groups are taken to include all groups outside of the state's
immediate purview and include economic, business-oriented groups as well as social
groups.
286 These include organized crime, black markets, and other phenomena that are
either prohibited or ignored altogether by the jurisdiction's formal legal apparatus.
287 AVINASH K. DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND EcONOMICs 25 (2004) (asserting that
informal arrangements are key to business transacting); accord PEJOVICH, supra note 45,
at 23 (discussing formal and informal rules); Peng, Wang & Jiang, supra note 22, at 927
(discussing the relationship between formal and informal institutions and their impact
upon business).
288 See Webb et al., supra note 16.
279
280
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originating in the culture.289
For its part, law is a form of social control. The law tends to
be stronger where alternative forms of social control are weaker.2 90
Though scholars quarrel about the precise nature of these
relationships, most agree that a country's political, economic, and
These intertwining
cultural systems are intertwined.29 1
relationships possess significant implications for the firm's
strategy.292

These very complex connections
following much-simplified figure:
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Figure 1: The rule of law process.

Tax revenues from economic activity are collected and
allocated by the political system to promote social stability, and
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Dejardin,

Entrepreneurship and Culture, in

ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN CONTEXT 175, 181-82 (Marco van Gelderen & Enno Masurel eds.,

2012) (asserting that uncertainty avoidance impacts entrepreneurship across cultures).
290 BLACK, supranote 37, at 105-09.

291 See generally, e.g., Mann, supra note 273 (detailing the relationships between
the political, economic, and cultural realms).
292 See generally id. (discussing the impact of such relationships between political,
economic, and cultural realms in the legal field).
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the political system also creates formal rules toward this goal.29 3
The socio-cultural background supplies informal institutions
which impact every step of the rule of law process.294 The legal
system-perhaps the single most important piece of the processencapsulates the content of the law and attempts to enforce
society's formal rules as they are influenced by the economic and
political realms and by the society's informal rules.2 95
The law's content and enforcement are shaped by the
interactions of these realms. One legal creature in particular-the
flexible law-is treated by the literature as an entirely negative
phenomenon because it necessitates the redirection of resources
from economic activities to the legal realm.29 6 Legal activities
ordinarily do not return direct profits like economic activities
do.297 In this sense, legal flexibilities are inefficient. This article
does not dispute the normative appeal of this reasoning but instead
considers whether this maligned phenomenon might possess any
value for the firm. Legal flexibilities are a net loss upon the firm
only if like any other cost in business, the firm fails to exploit
Irrespective of its ultimate
their value-creating potential.298
definition, the rule of law process allows the firm to capture value
between and within the legal and economic realms through the
strategic exploitation of legal flexibilities.2 99
C. The Three Forms of Legal Flexibility
Brian Tamanaha observes that "[w]hen rules exist and are
See generally Svetozar Pejovich, The Effects of the Interaction of Formal and
Informal Institutions on Social Stability and Economic Development, 2 J. MARKETS &
MORALITY 164 (1999) (discussing why there are differences in economic stabilities
among countries).
294 See Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Culture and Social Development, 4 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 29, 29 (1969) ("[L]egal systems are clearly a part of political, social, and
economic development, just as are educational systems and other areas of the culture.
No major social change occurs or is put into effect in a society which is not reflected in
some kind of change in its laws.").
295 See id.
296 See generally Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974) (discussing the legal process from an
economic standpoint).
297 See id
298 See id
299 See id
293
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honored by the legal system[,] formal legality operates."oo But
the discussion above reminds us that no legal system is perfectly
clear. Degrees prevail-degrees of clarity in the laws themselves,
degrees to which the laws are enforced, and degrees to which a
legal apparatus is influenced by the extra-legal forces of its
environment.30 1 Indeed, "[c]onformity to the rule of law is [itself]
a matter of degree."302 Because "[t]here is often a sizeable gap
between written law and actual regulatory practice,"30 3 any
practical definition of the "rule of law" must account for legal
flexibilities.3 04 The gaps between "the law in theory" and the "law
in practice" are cognizable under the "rule of law" rubric.305 The
three major forms of legal flexibility must therefore be considered
in detail.
1. Substantive Flexibilities
Substantive flexibilities consist of gaps and ambiguities in the
language of the laws themselves, and the resulting pliabilities
inherent in such language-that is, ambiguities accruing from the
substance of a jurisdiction's laws, as those laws are expressed
publicly. In high rule of law environments, the notion of
substantive flexibility is often expressed by the idea of "legal
arbitrage, which involves the interpretation of ambiguous law in

supra note 7, at 97.
Raz, supranote 6, at 4.
302 Id. at 8.
303 Frenkel, supra note 56, at 149.
304 See Raz, supra note 6, at 4-12.
305 See supra Part III.B. In addition to flexibilities within individual legal
systems,
"the transnational legal field . .. involves a considerable degree of ambiguity in decisionmaking since there is often disagreement as to which rules apply in specific cases."
Sigrid Quack, Legal Professionals and Transnational Law-Making: A Case of
Distributed Agency, 14 ORG. 643, 645-46 (2007). Transnational ambiguities are
important when two or more jurisdictions' rules might apply to a legal question, or when
venue is at issue. See, e.g., Robert Ware III, The Use of JurisdictionalArbitrage to
Support the Strategic Interest of the Firm, 38 U. TOL. L. REv. 307 (2006) (arguing that
international firms with Internet-focused strategies can use the doctrine of minimum
contacts in the United States to support jurisdiction over a given legal conflict, or to
defeat it). Once a jurisdiction is settled upon, however, the internal characteristics of the
jurisdiction are of interest. This article addresses internal legal flexibilities, not the
transnational field.
300
301

TAMANAHA,
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one's favor to avoid obligations." 3 06 Bird explains that "[e]ven the
most well-intentioned of drafters cannot anticipate all ambiguities
in statutory language, and firms exploit these ambiguities to full
Avoidance practices amount to "operational
effect." 307
effectiveness," which is "simply performing relevant activities
better than one's rivals."308 Yet operational effectiveness is not a
strategy: "[a]lthough necessary for superior performance, a firm
can ... outperform rivals through strategy only if it pursues a
differential practice that it can preserve."309 If substantive
flexibilities are to be utilized in a firm's strategy, they must be
harnessed in a sustainable manner.
Substantive flexibility is both linguistic (the mechanical
dimension) and jurisprudential (the interpretive dimension). The
linguistic component is inescapable: ambiguity permeates
language.3 10 There invariably exists some degree of linguistic
ambiguity in the laws of every nation"' since no language is
altogether free from ambiguity.3 12 Expressions of the law are
virtually never perfect, even when lawmakers intend them to be.313
If a perfect language existed, "legal interpretation" would be

306 Bird, Pathways of Legal Strategy, supra note 2, at 14-16; see also supra Part
II.G.4 (discussing legal arbitrage).
307 Bird, Pathwaysof Legal Strategy, supra note 2, at 14. The use of tax loopholes
a
is common example. Id.
308

Id. at 15.

309 Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added).
310 See Richard Robinson, Ambiguity, 50 MIND 140, 141 (1941).
311 "There is an inherent ambiguity in the language of the law." Rozann Rothman,
Stability and Change in a Legal Order: The Impact of Ambiguity, 83 ETHICS 37, 38
(1972); accord SOLAN, supra note 139, at 49 ("It is impossible to write a statute whose
words will not be subject to debate at the margins.").
312

See generally, e.g., UMBERTO Eco, THE SEARCH FOR THE PERFECT LANGUAGE

(1997) (chronicling Europe's elusive search for the "perfect language" in which no
ambiguities burden the clarity of expression and noting that no such language exists).
313 As British scholar William Markby noted in the early twentieth century:
[w]ere the law ideally complete, every command . .. would be expressed clearly
But... a great deal of the time of lawyers and judges is
and fully....
occupied in the endeavor to arrange and interpret obscure and conflicting rules,
and to make these rules wide enough to cover cases which have arisen. We are
perpetually in search of some clear and authoritative expression of the law,
which expression we very rarelyfind.
WILLIAM MARKBY, ELEMENTS OF LAW 107 (1905) (emphasis added).
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unnecessary.3 14 Moreover, contrary to the Coasian ideal,315 some
jurisdictions deliberately engineer substantive ambiguities into
their laws. 16 Still, "[t]he law is a profession of words." 17 "To be
of any use, the language of the law ... must not only express but
convey thought."3 18 Yet legal language tends to be wordy and
unclear.3 19
This often reflects an "inherent vagueness of
language," and as a result, laws often "make many attempts at
precision of expression."32 0 Although it might be defended on
grounds of "precision," legal language is ordinarily no more
precise than conventional language.32 ' Even in high rule of law
jurisdictions, "a law cannot, by itself, indicate exactly which sets
of factual circumstances are covered by it and which are not; by
necessity a law must be general, must apply to more than one
case."322 Furthermore, "a law must be expressed in words, and ...
'uncertainty at the borderline is the price to be paid for the use of
general [terms]. "'323
International firms potentially confront a double layer of
substantive ambiguity.32 4 Robert Rosen explains that "[1]anguage
is the expression of culture, enabling us to communicate through
the ages with people who share our history and identity."3 25 Yet
314 Ward Farnsworth, Dustin F. Guzior & Anup Malani, Ambiguity about
Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 257,
257 (2010). Disputants often contest the meanings of words and the semantics of
complex laws. SOLAN, supra note 139, at 22-37.
315 See supra Part II.F (discussing the Coase Theorem).
316 China is an example. WEl Luo, CHINESE LAW AND LEGAL RESEARCH 117
(2005).
317 DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW vii (1963).
318 Id.
319 Id. at 24-27.
Although Mellinkoffs work is limited to common law
jurisdictions in which English is the official language, id. at 3, these characterizations are
appropriate in other jurisdictions as well.
320 Id. at 22 (quoting Glanville L. Williams, Language and the Law, 61 L.Q. REV.
179, 192 (1945)).
321 See id. at 290-98 (discussing precision in legal language); id. at 345 (noting that
legal language is often no more precise than conventional language).
322 THEODORE M. BENDITr, LAW As RULE AND PRINCIPLE 30 (1978).
323 Id
324 See ROBERT ROSEN, GLOBAL LITERACIES 57-60 (2000) (asserting that language
divides people into two groups-those who understand it and those who do not).
325 Id at 57.
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"[b]y its very nature, a language creates both insiders and
outsiders-people who speak and understand it and people who
don't." 32 6 In addition to the obvious differences between broad
languages (English versus Mandarin, for example), the law
employs a special vocabulary, or "terms of art;" thus, even native
speakers will have difficulty grasping legal subtleties absent
formal legal training.3 27 If the law is to be a source of competitive
advantage, the firm must employ experts fluent in both the broad
and the legal languages of the relevant jurisdiction.3 28 This expert
is the entrepreneuriallawyer.329
Linguistic ambiguities come in several varieties. 3 30 "Language
is like a coin with two faces-lexicon and grammar, and both of
these essential features can be sources of ambiguity. "' A lexical
ambiguity "occurs whenever a word has more than one objective
or dictionary meaning."3 32 In contrast, syntactic ambiguity "has to
do with grammatical structure. Words occur in a particular order
and grammatical relationships are established by those orderings.
There is the potential for syntactic ambiguity whenever a given
order of words may allow for more than one grammatical
relationship." 33 3 Thus, words can carry multiple definitions 33 4 and
associations,3 " and context can shift meanings as well. 336 Deeper
structural connections can produce ambiguity. 37 Time can also

326

Id.

327

See id.

328

See id.
See infra Part IV.

329

330 For an outstanding discussion on linguistic ambiguities and their implications
for Western law, see generally Schane, supra note 176.
331 Id. at 172.
332 Id. at 171; accord JAMES R. HuRFoRD & BRENDAN HEASLEY, SEMANTICS: A

COURSEBOOK 128 (1983).
333

Schane, supra note 176, at 171; accord HURFORD & HEASLEY, supra note 332,

at 128.
334

See GEORGE A. MILLER, THE SCIENCE OF WORDS 151-55 (1991).

335 Id. at 155-58.
336 Id. at 250-55. Even the non-lingual context impacts word meanings. See F.R.
PALMER, SEMANTICS 43-58 (1976).
337

See, e.g., JOHN LYONS, INTRODUCTION TO THEORETICAL LINGUISTICS 249-52

(1968) (discussing transformational ambiguity).
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alter the meanings of words.33 8
Linguistic ambiguities are of interest because they introduce
the possibility of multiple potential, "legitimate" outcomes while
holding the language of the law itself, as well as the facts of a
given scenario, constant. 33 Unless a rule is crystal clear, "fresh
idealizations not found in the words of the rules are entering
constantly into the shaping of the meaning of the rules."3 40 By
definition, linguistic ambiguities allow for multiple readings of the
law and thereby create new risks 34 1 for regulated parties.3 42 But
substantive legal ambiguities also present the opportunity to read
the law in a manner advantageous to the firm and to persuade
authorities to adopt one's reading (at least with respect to one's
own firm). 3 43 "Flexibility is the most conspicuous characteristic of
legal language . . . '[A]mbiguity is neither incidental nor
accidental. For lawyers and their organized clients, it is the most
useful attribute of legal language.'"
Together with ambiguities,
gaps in the law also qualify as substantive flexibilities: areas
cloaked in the law's silence are inviting opportunities for
competitive advantage as well.34 5
The jurisprudential component of substantive flexibility is
338 MELLINKOFF, supra note 317, at 397-98 ("A great difficulty, an insuperable one,
is to write language that time will not change."); Rothman, supra note 311, at 37 ("The
meanings of words change as time passes.").
339 Schane, supra note 176, at 179-86 (discussing examples from American case
law in which linguistic ambiguities invited different resolutions to cases).
340 LLEWELLYN, supra note 128, at 44.
341 By "new risks," this article refers to risks that do not occur naturally in an
unregulated market.
342 For example, linguistic ambiguities can cause contracting parties to
misunderstand their agreement and can inspire conflict between firms and government.
Schane, supranote 176, at 179-89.
343 See generally Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter O. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal

Strategy, in LEGAL STRATEGIES:

How

CORPORATIONS

USE

LAW

TO IMPROVE

PERFORMANCE 41 (Antoine Masson & Mary J. Shariff eds., 2010) (addressing the
example of persuading judges on matters of legal interpretation). These scholars rely
upon "a conception of law in which cases and statutes are almost wholly indeterminate
and strategists infuse meaning into these empty rules in the process of argumentation."
Id. The meaning attributed to a given rule "derives from social norms, patterns of
outcomes, local practices and understandings, informal rules of factual inference,
systems imperatives, community expectations, and so-called public policies." Id.
344 Rothman, supra note 311, at 42.
345

BENDITT, supra note 322, at 485-86.
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equally important. Since the laws will contain some degree of
linguistic ambiguity, every legal system must designate those with
the authority to interpret the laws, and which rules, if any, these
authorities must observe during the interpretation process.34 6
Significantly, authorities have discretion to interpret the law so as
to expand their own authority.3 47 The decision-maker's degree of
discretion is determined in part by whether a rule or a standard
applies to the legal issue at hand. 3 48 For some observers, "[t]here
is more discretion in [the average] legal system . .. than is

required by the need to apply vague rules."3 49 The frequency and
scope of these possibilities swell as one descends into
progressively lower rule of law environments.350
2. Enforcement Flexibilities
Enforcementflexibilities exist when the state or another entity
could legitimately (lawfully) take a given course of action with
respect to the firm, but instead legitimately takes an alternative
course of action, or none at all. 3 ' Enforcement flexibilities are of
value because the law's theoretical dimension never imposes itself
upon the firm: it is the law in practice that counts. Of course,
what is gleaned from the law as it is formally stated can help
predict what the law in practice will look like; but this connection,
upon which Western attorneys are accustomed to relying,
disintegrates in lower rule of law environments.35 2 Scholars in
346 See, e.g., PEJOVICH, supra note 45, at 133 (noting that "even the most neutral
constitutional frame is subject to interpretation by those in charge of its enforcement").
347

See WILLIAM R. BISHIN & CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE AND ETHICS

413-15 (1972).
348 Standards are open-ended legal norms that leave the decision-maker with
discretion; rules are more specific and concrete norms that leave less flexibility for the
decision-maker. Both standards and rules can generate uncertainties for regulated
parties. Ehud Guttel & Alon Harel, Uncertainty Revisited: Legal Prediction and Legal
Postdiction, 107 MICH. L. REV. 467, 479-80 (2008).
349 BENDITr, supra note 322, at 32.
350 See infra Part Ill.D.
351 DAVIS, supra note 122, at 4 ("A public officer has discretion whenever the
effective limits on his power leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of
action or inaction.").
352 Cf Margaret Levi & Brad Epperly, Principled Principals in the Founding
Moments of the Rule of Law, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RULE OF LAW 192, 192

(2010) ("When coercion is the only or even primary means to achieve compliance, laws
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high rule of law jurisdictions sometimes erroneously assume that
"the law in theory" and "the law in practice" are unified
everywhere,3 53 indiscreetly projecting their own experiences upon
unfamiliar foreign legal systems.3 54 Most of the world does not
live in a unified environment. "Even in the West[,] the unity of
the formal [law] and [the law in practice] is never complete."
This divide represents another opportunity for legal competitive
advantage. As C.G. Veljanovski points out, "the impact of
regulation depends crucially on the extent and intensity of
enforcement." 35 6 Likewise, "[t]he credibility of rules depends on
their enforcement."3 57
Thus, the provisions and means for
enforcing laws are as important to the firm as the laws'
substance. 58 Variations in enforcement present a key challenge to
the Coasian prescription.359 "Rules that are loosely enforced ...
cease to be a predictor of human behavior. The result is higher
transaction costs of exchange and fewer exchanges. From an
individual standpoint, rules yield a flow of benefits. The source of

may exist but not the rule of law."); see also RIGGS, supra note 269, at 57-58
(distinguishing formal law-"the official norm, the theory ... what ought to be done, as
expressed in constitutions, laws, rules, and regulations"-from effective law-"what
actually happens, the unofficial conduct, the practice, the informal, the real behavior of
people, officials, politicians, administrators, pressure groups").
353 RIGGS, supra note 269, at 58.
354 See supra Part II.D (critiquing the existing "law as competitive advantage"
literature for assuming the presence of high rule of law institutions).
355 RIGGS, supra note 269, at 58.

356 C.G. Veljanovski, The Market for Regulatory Enforcement, 93 ECON. J. 123,
123 (1983).
357 PEJOVICH, supranote 174, at 42.
358 See Champe S. Andrews, The Importance of the Enforcement of Law, 34
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 85, 85 (1909).

359 One version of the Coase Theorem holds that the initial allocation of rights is
unimportant since parties will negotiate the most efficient outcomes to their transactions.
But this view "relies, among other assumptions, on the possibility of effective judicial
enforcement of complicated contracts." Edward Glaeser, Simon Johnson & Andrei
Shleifer, Coase Versus the Coasians, 116 Q.J. Eco. 853, 854 (2001) (discussing the
flaws of this assumption, including the judiciary's need to "interpret broad and
ambiguous language" during the enforcement process). It follows that the consistency
and effectiveness of enforcement is partially driven by the frequency and complexity of
substantive ambiguities. Our three basic varieties of legal flexibility are decidedly
interrelated, though they are discrete phenomena.
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those benefits is the predictability of other people's behavior."36 0
There are four primary causes of enforcement variations.
First, states are subject to the general law of scarcity: resources
are finite, so the resources available for law enforcement are
limited.361 "There is one decisive reason why the society must
forego 'complete' enforcement of the rule: enforcement is
costly." 362 From the resource perspective, "optimal enforcement
requires incomplete and selective enforcement because the social
harm flowing from regulatory offences may be less than the
Efficient law enforcement will therefore be
private gain.
discretionary, designed to fine tune rules in the light of firm and
offence specific cost factors."36 3 This is true even in higher rule of
law environments such as the United States.3 64
This leads to the second driver of enforcement flexibilities:
some enforcement is discretionary.3 65 This discretion may be
conferred expressly, may result from substantive ambiguities in
the law (such that it is unclear whether a given law must be
enforced in a given scenario or against a particular firm, or where
it is unclear which state agent is to do the enforcing), or may be
imposed by necessity in derogation of the law (agencies may
clearly be tasked with enforcement but may be selective due to
limited resources).36 6 To the degree that discretion controls, the
law in practice "will differ markedly from that on the statute books
because the enforcement official is not only enforcing the law but
he is making it through his enforcement decisions."36 7
360 PEJOVICH, supra note 45, at 24.

361 Veljanovski, supra note 356, at 123-24 (discussing the efficiency model, which
"predicts that enforcement will be less than complete because of the agency's limited
resources").
362 Id. at 124.

363 Id. Law enforcement will display market-like tendencies because compliance
secured by cooperation is "cheaper than legal conflict and yields tangible results if
successful." Id. at 126.
364 BRYNER, supra note 139, at 6 (noting that in the United States, "[v]irtually all
[government] agencies exercise discretion in allocating and directing resources for
enforcement activities, since the number of regulated entities and actions within agency
jurisdictions exceeds the available resources"). For numerous examples of discretion in
the United Sates legal system, see id. at 9-12.
365 Veljanovski, supra note 356, at 124 (discussing efficient law enforcement).
366 See id. at 124-28.
367 Id. at 128; see also Levi & Epperly, supra note 352, at 203 (explaining that
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Third, perfect information is virtually never available in the
real world.368 Parties may not be aware that their legal rights have
been undermined; the administrative apparatus may not enforce
every regulation because not every violation will be known to
officials.6 Imperfect information can result in either optimal or
suboptimal outcomes for either the firm or the state.370
Finally, officials' incompetence and entropy can cause
bureaucratic failures.37
The "self-interest of the administrator
generates not only a tendency to rigidity (to minimize the risk of
criticism from superiors), but a systematic likelihood of the
nonperformance of some proportion of the routinely handled tasks
of the bureaucracy." 372 Of course, the regulated party's selfinterest "generates an increased sensitivity to any failure in the
individual case, if only because the expectation of perfect
performance by the bureaucrat has been built into the individual's
strategy of behavior." 3 7 3 Firms must form sensible expectations
concerning enforcement.
Webb and his coauthors observe that "[e]ntrepreneurs exploit
opportunities in the informal economy by taking advantage of the
imperfections in the enforcement of laws and regulations."3 74
Attorneys can craft legal strategies in a similar vein, resulting in
heightened market opportunities for the client, and in turn
increasing the likelihood that the advantage thus gained over rivals
will be sustainable. Enforcement flexibilities are particularly
prevalent in low rule of law jurisdictions, so the international firm
must readjust its expectations in those places.
3. Systemic Flexibilities
The legal system's environment is a vital determinant of both

"Bureaucrats and officials . . . can engage in corruption, shirk their mandates, and
selectively enforce laws," and, thus, "[t]hey have the capability to openly sabotage
attempts to [achieve] a rule of law equilibrium").
368 See Veljanovski, supra note 356, at 126-27.
369 See id. at 208-13.
370 See id.
371 MASTERS, supra note 233, at 206-07 (discussing the Peter Principle).
372 Id. at 207.

Id.
374 Webb et al., supra note 16, at 500.
373
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its nature and effectiveness.375 Systemic flexibilities result from the
dynamic interrelationships of the constituent parts of the rule of
law process (that is, from the legal system's interactions with
extra-legal forces), and from the legal system's defining internal
attributes other than its substantive and enforcement flexibilities.
At a minimum, systemic flexibilities include:
(1) Legal uncertainties resulting from the legal system's
interaction with the social/cultural, economic, and
political systems of the country, and with foreign
influences;

(2) The strength (or weakness)

of foundational legal

sources, such as constitutions;

(3) The total number of laws and their relative substantive

complexities;376
(4) The rate and extent of change in the law over time;
(5) The number, complexity, and relative powers of legal
authorities, both horizontally (legislative versus
administrative versus judicial) and vertically (central
versus local levels of the state);
(6) The percentage and effect of laws that are not made
public;
(7) The extent to which legal authorities have (and are
permitted to have) an interest in the outcomes of legal
questions; 37 7
(8) The political vicissitudes of the state; and
(9) Variations in legal culture throughout the jurisdiction. 3 78
375 See supra Part III.B.
376 PEJOVICH, supra note 45, at 47 (observing that the number and complexity of
laws in a jurisdiction are partly a function of the interaction between formal and informal
rules).
377 Naturally, a legal system's evolution will reflect such interests. See generally,
e.g., Daniel Klerman, JurisdictionalCompetition and the Evolution of the Common Law,
74 U. CHI. L. REv. 1179 (2007) (demonstrating the development of pro-plaintiff bias in
English common law prior to 1799 when English judges personally received fees for
hearing cases, English courts competed for cases, and plaintiffs chose the forum).
378 Systemic flexibilities tend to be dynamic and fluid and, therefore, highly
complex. Variations in legal outcomes within a jurisdiction are explainable in part
because many factors affecting legal outcomes, including legal culture, "are not uniform
within the neat boundaries of the legal jurisdiction." LoPucki & Weyrauch, supra note
343, at 83. Legal determinants "are forged by frequent interactions among members of
groups. The locations of these groups are rarely co-extensive with the city, state, or
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These phenomena generate uncertainties in the law, but none
are substantive or enforcement issues. Systemic flexibilities are
the most varied type of legal flexibility and can be the most
difficult to recognize, analyze, and exploit.3 79
D. The FundamentalRelationship between Rule ofLaw
Observation andLegal Flexibility
Let us momentarily imagine the "perfect" legal state. By this,
we do not imply anything about its substantive virtues. Rather, the
"perfect legal state" functions perfectly, however its objectives
may be defined; it is a legal system perfectly effective at carrying
out the enterprises ascribed to it by the culture it governs. The
perfect legal state, in other words, is entirely free of the three
flexibilities just discussed. The perfect legal state perfectly
enforces every law on every occasion. It can do this because it
enjoys perfect (infinite) resources and perfect information, and
because the laws being enforced are crystal clear, free from
substantive ambiguity.
Further, the perfect legal system is
unaffected by its context, so systemic flexibilities do not inject
variations or uncertainties into the legal process.
From the vantage of the perfect system, legal flexibilities
amount to "imperfections." Yet, in practice, these "imperfections"
present opportunities for significant value capture. The nature of
these opportunities and their prevalence will vary across
jurisdictions, as do the optimal strategies for harnessing them.
Whenever flexibility or discretion exists in the law, the
conclusion of any particular legal question is less than certain prior
to its formal resolution. The less assured a legal outcome is, the
greater the opportunity: "laws vary greatly in clarity and so in the
opportunity they present to organizations for negotiation."38 0
Part III.C revealed three categories of legal flexibility:
substantive ambiguities, which exist in the language of the laws
themselves; enforcement ambiguities, which result from finite
resources, imperfect information, and discretion; and systemic
ambiguities, which are kindled in the dynamic interrelationships of

national boundaries that define the reach of legal doctrine." Id.
379 See id.
380 ScoT, supra note 48, at 126.
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the constituent parts of the rule of law process.3 1' The extent to
which the international lawyer might utilize these flexibilities
depends upon just how flexible the law may be. At issue are three
variables: the total quantum of flexibilities in a legal system (how
commonly they occur); the nature of the flexibilities (where they
occur within the legal system, and the forms they assume); and the
flexibilities' average scope (just how flexible the flexibilities are).
Legal flexibilities are a question of both degree (the "quantity" of
uncertainties) and quality (the types of risks created). This article
posits a proportionate, inverse relationship between (1) the degree
to which the rule of law is observed in a given state, and (2) the
degree to which legal flexibility exists in the state. This
relationship can be expressed visually as follows:

High

Region 21Higher

Rule of LawSState

~

3: LowRule
Region

I

Low

Degree of Legal Flexibility

FIgure 2: Relationship between the rule of law and legal flexiblltles.

All other things equal, then, it is axiomatic that the greater the
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See supra Part III.C.
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flexibility there exists in a given state's legal apparatus, the
weaker the rule of law is. States are bound and defined by the five
regions in Figure 2.
Region (1), the vertical dashed line, represents the "natural
baseline"-every state will contain at least this degree of
"imperfection" in its legal substance, legal enforcement, and
systemic qualities. 38 2 The law invariably contains a certain
minimum degree of flexibility.3 83 This inherent flexibility is the
result of two forces previously explored. First, no language is
perfectly unambiguous: even when states aspire toward the
Coasian ideal of perfectly clear laws (and especially when they do
not), substantive ambiguities are inescapable.3 84
Second,
enforcement flexibilities will always exist."' Finite resources,
discretion for parties and state officials, and imperfect information
will preclude the perfect enforcement of the laws.38 6 A natural
baseline of "imperfection," therefore, prevails in all legal systems.
Point (A) represents the hypothetically "perfect" legal system, in
which no flexibilities transpire. Such a state does not exist in the

real world.3 87
Region (2) represents states whose institutions generally tend
toward the Coasian ideal-that is, legal systems that observe the
rule of law to a high degree. The United States is an example.38
Even high rule of law states contain select flexibilities in their
laws and experience some degree of legal uncertainty.38 9 In the
United States, many substantive ambiguities result from the

382 See supra Part III.C.
383 See supra Part III.C.
384 See supra Part IlI.C. 1.
385 See supra Part III.C.2.
386 Veljanovski, supra note 356, at 123-24 (discussing the efficiency model, which
"predicts that enforcement will be less than complete because of the agency's limited
resources").
387 PEJOVICH, supra note 45, at 39 (noting that no country qualifies as a perfect rule
of law state, as "the concept of the rule of law provides an ideal yardstick for comparison
of alternative institutions").
388 See, e.g., Jerry Brito & Drew Perraut, Transparency and Performance in
Government, 11 N.C. J. L. & Tech. 161, 162 (2010).
389 See, e.g., CARDOZO, supra note 117, at 3-4 (discussing areas of uncertainty in
American law).
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political process.3 90 Select enforcement flexibilities also exist in
the American judiciary: prosecutorial discretion, an example from
criminal law, and settlement during litigation, an example from
civil law.3 9' In high rule of law jurisdictions, "social control is
primarily the function of the state and is exercised through law."392
Social stability "operates chiefly through law, that is, through the
systematic and orderly application of force by the appointed
agents." 39 3 High rule of law states carry out these functions
effectively.3 94
In contrast is the state that routinely builds flexibility into its
legal system either to serve orchestrated political ends or because
it can do no differently under the circumstances. 395 These states
are found in Region (3). China is an example of the first type: the
Communist Party ensures that legal flexibility is endemic because
control is easier to maintain and carries a minimal corresponding
loss of legitimacy.396 Frequently, as in China's case, this type of
system revolves around the maintenance of a political
monopoly.3 97 These states reject the Coase Theorem's goal of
legal clarity since the maximization of private economic activity is
not the principal goal; rather, the political incumbents' survival is
the paramount goal.39" This stands in contrast to higher rule of law
environments, where a stable balance between legal certainties and
legal flexibilities is institutionalized. 399 Greatly impoverished

390 See generally id (discussing uncertainties in the American law).
391

See id.

392 POUND, supra note 35, at 25.
393 Id.
394

See id.

395

See

PETER

HOWARD

CORNE,

FOREIGN

INVESTMENT

IN

CHINA:

THE

ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL SYSTEM 93-94 (1997) (noting inter alia that in China, "laws are

intentionally made
implementation").
396

See id

397

See id.

ambiguous

to

enable

flexibility

in

interpretation

and

398 See GILPIN, supra note 276, at 41 (noting "[i]n any jurisdiction, the government,
powerful domestic interests, and historical experiences determine the purpose of the
economy.").
399 DAVIS, supra note 122, at 27 ("What is obviously needed [to achieve a high rule
of law state] is balance-discretionary power which is neither excessive nor
inadequate.").
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states also tend toward the low rule of law. 40 0 Legal flexibility in
these places may result from poverty (and insufficient resources
for law enforcement) or from the lack of regular political
consensus.40 1 Ultimately, "[t]he boundaries of the Fourth World
are defined not by poverty but by rule of law or the lack of it." 402
Between the higher rule of law states of Region (2) and the
lower rule of law states of Region (3), Region (4) states exist. In
isolation, these would be low rule of law jurisdictions, but they are
instead "pulled upward" by potent external forces.4 03 For example,
a developing nation recently acceded to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) might historically tend to embrace flexibility,
but may now observe the rule of law to a greater degree as a result
of the new external pressure (i.e., its WTO obligations).4 04 In
these states, institutional adaptation is enabled to accommodate
outside forces without undercutting the most entrenched domestic
interests.40 5 In eras past, when comparatively little commerce
flowed freely between countries, military domination and
colonialism were the primary drivers of Region (4) states.406

400

SHARMA, supra note 187, at 187.

401

See id.

Id
403 The international relations literature categorizes states in terms of their relative
402

power and size. See, e.g., MARGARET P. KARNS & KAREN A. MINGST, INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATIONS 250-65 (2004) (discussing different sized states). Region (4) states are
common: "[s]mall states have been able to bargain with major powers for support on key
issues in return for economic concessions." Id. at 265.
404

DANIEL C.K. CHow, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN

A NUTSHELL 65 (2003); TREBILCOCK & DANIELS, supra note 257, at 341-52 (discussing

options that powerful states have to encourage rule of law reforms in lower rule of law
jurisdictions, including foreign aid and sanctions). See generally JAMES C. HsIUNG,
ANARCHY & ORDER (1997) (discussing international relations, international law, and the
influence of states upon one another in the absence of a global legal order).
405 See Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating the World Trade Organization,96 AMER. J.
INT'L L. 28, 46 (2002); see also generally Krzyztof J. Pelc, Why Do Some Countries Get
Better WTO Access on Terms than Others?, 65 INT'L ORG. 639 (2011).
406 See, e.g., Veronica L. Taylor, The New Agenda for Rule of Law Assistance, 104
N.W. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 260, 260 (2010) (noting that "[c]olonial powers and
twentieth-century invaders frequently used the military to organize and deliver both
military and civilian justice"); see also generally Sandra Fullerton Joireman, Inherited
Legal Systems and Effective Rule of Law: Africa and the Colonial Legacy, 39 J. OF
MODERN AFRICA STUD. 571 (2001) (discussing the effectiveness of common law and

civil law colonial powers in Africa's post-colonial environment).
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Today, globalization and its myriad forces define the Region (4)
states.40 7
Region (5) descends from a low degree of order into societal
dysfunctionality. Region (5) represents the threshold for failed
states, in which rule of law observance is so low that civil society
cannot function. Thus, Point (B) on Figure 2 describes the least
stable state likely to sustain a reasonably functional market over
time, and Point (C) represents bona fide anarchy, where the rule of
law is literally nonexistent. "Anarchy is social life without law,
that is, without governmental control."4 08 Black urges that "[1]ike
law ... [,] the quantity of anarchy varies across societies, across
the settings of a single society, and across time."40 9 These
societies may intend to establish legal order, but are unable to do
so. 4 10 At the extreme, countries characterized by perennial
instability are unable to enforce even basic laws. Anarchy renders
the development of organized commerce nearly impossible; in
turn, the state cannot effectively raise revenues or fund services,
and the cycle continues. 4 1
From the state's perspective, both predictability and flexibility
in the law are needed simultaneously. 412 An entirely inflexible law
is detrimental to the individual firm, 413 yet a "well-functioning
law" seldom makes for legal competitive advantage: without
uncertainty, there can be no entrepreneurship; 414 without
entrepreneurial activity, the firm is deprived of a major avenue for
creating competitive advantage.4 15 This topic is considered at
407 See, e.g., KARNS & MINGST, supra note 403, at 260-65.
408 BLACK, supra note 37, at 123.

Id.
410 Scholars disagree on how order is most effectively initiated. See generally, e.g.,
Levi & Epperly, supra note 352 (suggesting that social elites must initiate the rule of
law).
409

411

BLACK, supra note 37, at 123.

412 See supra Part II.E.
413 Whether legal flexibility is desirable for a firm will depend upon its ability to
manage the risks and opportunities attendant to such flexibility. See infra Part IV.
414 YANG, supra note 89, at 10 (noting that there was no place for entrepreneurship
in the Maoist economy because "the very condition for the emergence of
entrepreneurship, i.e., uncertainty, [had] been eliminated").
415 See Jeffrey G. Covin & Morgan P. Miles, Entrepreneurshipand the Pursuitof
Competitive Advantage, 23 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAc. 47, 50 (1999) (arguing

inter alia that entrepreneurial activity in a variety of corporate contexts can yield
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length in Part IV, infra.
E. Defining "The Rule ofLaw "for InternationalFirms
The rule of law, then, is the process by which a society's
official rules are generated and implemented.4 16 One of the most
significant features of this process is the extent to which it supplies
certainties in the content and enforcement of the rules. The greater
total flexibility there exists in a legal system, the lower its rule of
law observation. But something more than the "degree of legal
flexibility" is needed to meaningfully define the rule of law for
purposes of business strategy. The legal system must again be
considered in context.
Let us imagine the total set of all possible value-creating
activities in which the firm could engage. This set is labeled AT
(activities, total). In practice, some subset of these activities will
be prohibited by either law or cost. Effective legal proscriptions
exist where a sufficiently consistent and comprehensive law
enforcement system prevails and the expected penalties for
engaging in the activity exceed the expected gains. Other
activities may simply cost too much. These situations are labeled
Ap (activities, prohibited).
What remains are the activities
plausibly available to the firm, or AA (activities, available). This
can be expressed quantitatively as AT - Ap = AAUnder the Normative Coase Theorem, AA ought to be
maximized as a proportion of AT by (1) permitting most activities
(few activities should be illegalized), and (2) implementing
unambiguous and well-enforced laws (risks and transaction costs
should be minimized by enabling all parties to predict accurately
the legal ramifications of a given act).
Just as the law may promote economic activity,4 17 the law can
also shift an activity from the realm of possibility (AA) to the realm
of prohibition (Ap), and this may happen to some firms but not to
others.4 18 The law's removal of activities from "possible" to

competitive advantage).
416 See supra Parts 1II.A-D.
417 See supra Part II.E (discussing the rights hypothesis).
418 Much of the Coasian literature appears to assume uniformity in the degree to
which legal flexibilities discourage economic activity. But this is really a subjective
measure that must be evaluated across individual firms. Adroit firms-those less risk-
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"prohibited" can be accomplished in three ways. First, the law
might expressly and credibly prohibit the activity by its own terms
(for example, a law declaring that "it is hereby illegal to sell
cocaine" and providing serious and credible penalties for the sale
of cocaine).4 19 Second, the law may impose requirements so
onerous that compliance is cost prohibitive (for example, requiring
123 steps to open a new business).42 0 Such requirements do not
expressly prohibit the activity, nor are the requirements unclear.
Rather, compliance is simply too costly. The third avenue is
through legal flexibility.4 2' Legal flexibilities may psychologically
disincentivize the firm from pursuing a given activity by
introducing uncertainties and risks.4 22 Legal flexibilities can also
raise costs-the firm must expend resources for lawyers who
"transact" with the legal system and thereby manage the
flexibilities.4 23 Here, the act of compliance is not the problem;
instead, costs invariably are incurred to determine and to monitor
which acts will constitute acceptable compliance.4 24 Often, legal
flexibility affords multiple legitimate forms of compliance, in
which case the firm must also determine which is optimal.
The Coase Theorem counsels that if policymakers' paramount
goal is to maximize a jurisdiction's total economic output, the
state itself must contribute as few transaction costs as possible.425
Yet, while a society's interests and those of a given firm will
always partially overlap, they are virtually never coterminous. An
individual firm is not driven to maximize the jurisdiction's output,
but rather to optimize its own performance. The firm remains
motivated by its own interests even if the legal flexibilities

averse and those better able to manage costs (those with entrepreneurial lawyers)-can
realize greater profits in low rule of law jurisdictions than they could under the Coasian
ideal. This is true because the law itself can be a source of competitive advantage.
419 See generally SOLAN, supra note 139, at 23-37 (discussing ambiguity in the
plain language of a law and various interpretations).
420 See generally CHINLOY, supra note 63 (discussing the costs imposed upon firms
by the regulatory apparatus in the United Sates and abroad).
421 See supra Parts III.B-D. (discussing differing degrees of legal flexibility).
422 See supra Parts III.B-D.
423 See supra Parts III.B-D.
424 See supra Parts III.B-D.
425 See supra notes 175-180 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that
ambiguous laws generate transaction costs).
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enabling its activities are macroeconomically suboptimal.42 6 From
the firm's perspective, a marginal reduction in the country's
macroeconomic output is "worth it" if the legal flexibility
responsible for the reduction can be harnessed to the firm's net
benefit.42 7
From the Coasian perspective, then, legal flexibilities are bad
because they can render an activity cost-prohibitive or unduly
risky.428 But not all opportunities removed from the economic
sphere are deposited into the prohibited realm. The legal and
political spheres also hold opportunities, functioning as a sort of
limbo between the economic marketplace and the realm of
prohibited activities.429
In low rule of law environments,
seemingly prohibited activities are often still available; they
simply require legal dexterity to access.430 Opportunities shifted to
the legal realm are in fact preserved (albeit with a much-altered
appearance) and are perhaps also amplified (the opportunity's
expected value will rise, all other things equal, as fewer rivals can
access it in its new form). 43 1
Every theoretically-possible business activity resides in one of
four places: (1) the economic realm (if transaction costs are
nominal such that the opportunity can be accessed with little
thought given to the law); (2) the legal realm (if the law's
features-chiefly, its degree of flexibility-impose non-trivial
costs upon the economic activity); (3) the political realm (if
426 In this respect, legal flexibilities may subject legal institutions to a tragedy of
the commons predicament.
427 See generally supra notes 413-16, 418, and infra note 490 and accompanying
text (providing that law "may promote economic activity" but that a "'well-functioning
law' seldom makes for legal competitive advantage," and that firms are profit driven).

428

See KHANNA & PALEPU, supra note 212, at 53 (providing that "institutional

voids impose costs on market participants").
429 See supra notes 277-281 and accompanying text (asserting that "political forces
largely determine the economic realm's contours"). See generally infra notes 482-485
and accompanying text (noting that the legal and political realms define "the boundaries
of legitimate activity within the economic sphere").
430 See generally infra Part IV.C.4 (explaining that in low rule of law jurisdictions,
firms must be creative in order to take advantage of legal flexibilities); infra note 474
and accompanying text (stating that attorneys should "think more . . . creatively about
their work" by taking a multidisciplinary approach) (quoting Frenkel, supra note 56).
431 See generally infra note 538 and accompanying text (defining competitive
advantage as a firm taking advantage of an opportunity that its rivals cannot).
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lobbying or other political action must be undertaken in order to

pursue the economic activity); or (4) the prohibited realm (Ap) (if
the combined costs imposed by the jurisdiction's institutions, or
the lack thereof, exceed the expected value of the activity). 432
Thus, every available activity (AA) can be expressed as a ratio of
the total assets that must be expended to conduct the activity
across the economic, legal, and political realms, respectively.
Under the Coase Theorem, the ideal ratio is 100:0:0, where no
legal ambiguities exist, and where all of the firm's energy can be
committed to the economic realm. 433 Legal flexibilities effectively
serve as "detours." Where no legal flexibilities exist, the firm can
commit all of its resources and attention directly to the economic
sphere.434 All other things equal,43 5 the greater the average
flexibilities (that is, the lower the rule of law in the country), the
more of a detour the firm must take through the legal realm in
order to pursue available activities. If the sum of all the legal
flexibilities relevant to an activity becomes too substantial, then
the law has imposed so many costs that the activity can no longer
be profitable (and so is relegated to the prohibited realm). 436 But
an activity does not become cost-prohibitive upon the imposition
of the slightest cost. Indeed, most legal flexibilities do not render
an activity prohibitive; rather, they merely necessitate an
expenditure of resources in the legal realm as a prerequisite to
realizing the activity's full economic value.43 7 It follows that E =

432 See generally supra Part IlI.B (noting that the economic, legal, and political
spheres are distinct, but that they all are linked to one another).
433 See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text (discussing the Normative
Coase Theorem).
434 See supra notes 160, 177-79 and accompanying text.
435 This is an important qualifier. Greater flexibilities make for a greater detour
through the legal realm only if the firm passively accepts the costs imposed by the legal
flexibilities it encounters. As Part IV will show, however, a given flexibility will not
impose the same costs upon all firms in practice, even if all firms are pursuing the
identical activity. This is because some firms will manage legal flexibilities to their net
advantage by hiring entrepreneurial lawyers capable of navigating the flexibilities more
efficiently and effectively, thereby generating new and unique benefits from the
flexibilities. See infra notes 439-442 and accompanying text.
436 See Parts II.F and II.G.3 (discussing regulatory costs).
437 Most opportunities in the legal realm would be profitable without innovation on
the firm's part-but the firm can harness legal flexibilities to discover new benefits
beyond the immediate economic activity at hand. See infra Part IV.
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AA- (L + P), where E is the set of opportunities available in the
economic realm and where L and P are the sets of opportunities in
the legal and political realms, respectively. The firm's "economic
opportunities" consist of available activities that have not been
redirected by legal flexibilities to the legal or political realms.
These ideas are illustrated as follows:

AT

Figure 3: Distribution of the firm's value-creating activities, accounting for
legal flexibilities and assuming no intervention by the firm.

Coasian conditions may be best for society at large, but some
other set of conditions may be optimal for a given firm. Some of
the Coasian literature implicitly treats transaction costs as fixed; it
assumes that no effort is made by the firm to manage costs at their
source.43 8 In fact, transaction costs need not remain fixed-at
least, not for every firm. To the degree that an activity's path is
diverted through the legal sphere, experts in the law-

438 See Thomas Hazlett, Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Ronald
Coase, 54 J.L & ECON. 125, 131 (2011) (noting that the Stiglerian version of Coasean
analysis "implicitly takes 'transaction costs' as a fixed feature of markets, exogenous
from the legal rules or regulations imposed by the state," and that this view is
"incorrect").
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entrepreneurial lawyers-are needed.43 9 Initially, the hiring of
such an attorney is itself a net cost, but the transaction costs
associated with legal flexibilities can be shifted downward by
skillful lawyering. 440 Transaction costs are not static; if legal
flexibilities create variable costs and variable risks, then they are
susceptible, in part, to the firm's influence. 44 1 The entrepreneurial
lawyer dynamically interacts with the sources of these costs,
lowering them for the firm." 2 Whereas conventional lawyers may
represent a means to avoid certain future costs (those imposed
upon the firm's legal breaches), entrepreneurial lawyers are
affirmative, net value creating assets for the firm.
For all legitimate activities, some degree of either value
capture or risk reduction (or both) will have to occur by way of the
law, or else be irrevocably forfeited. 443 Even illegitimate activities
must account for the law by eluding it altogether, an exercise
which itself imposes transaction costs. Legal flexibilities create
two barriers to the free availability of an economic activity. First,
there is an innovation threshold; it can be difficult to discern the
options for managing a legal flexibility.44 4 Second, there is the
question of how best to manage the flexibility. 445 By discerning
the optimal management of legal flexibilities, the entrepreneurial
lawyer is a cost manager. 4 46 The transaction costs resulting from
439 See infra Part IV.

440 See Mitnick, supra note 65, at 76-78, 84 (asserting that firms can lower costs by
exploiting regulation to their advantage relative to their competitors in the same market,
and at other times, that regulation forces competitors out of the market; in either case,
"[t]he costs of regulation are real (as can be the benefits), [and] they do not affect all
firms in a market equivalently," thereby lowering costs for some while increasing costs
for their competitors).
441 See generally supra notes 158-163 and accompanying text (providing that "legal
flexibility is a seventh source of transaction costs").
442 See Dew, supra note 162, at 20 (arguing that institutional entrepreneurs
effectively act with the goal of reducing transaction costs).
443 See generally supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (noting that the "use
[of] the law and the legal system [present opportunities] to increase both the total value
created and the share of that value captured by the firm") (quoting Bagley, supra note
62, at 588).
4

See DING Lu, ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN SUPPRESSED MARKETS 15 (1994).

445 See generally infra Part IV.C.1 (noting that legal entrepreneurship involves
determining "how best to achieve strategic outcomes for the client ... by the deliberate
and innovative exploitation of one or more legal flexibilities").
446 See generally infra notes 567-578 and accompanying text (providing that
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flexible laws may be too high if the firm is unequipped to cope
with them-that is, they may be prohibitively high if the firm
confines itself to the economic realm only, without engaging the
legal realm.4 47
This discussion suggests many ways to define the "rule of law"
from the business perspective. The rule of law is the degree to
which state institutions supply, or fail to supply, certainties in the
rules governing economic activity. The rule of law reveals the
extent to which the firm must allocate resources to legal activities
in the pursuit of economic opportunities. But it also represents a
range of opportunities for value creation unique to the individual
firm. It follows that high rule of law prevails where institutions
supply equally and publicly distributed certainties (security or
guarantees-rights, in the lawyer's parlance), and low rule of law
exists where institutions are not designed with such an end goal in
mind (they may be designed with any number of alternative
priorities in sight).
To the extent that the firm can distinctively harness legal
flexibilities, it is said to possess a legal competitive advantage.
Low rule of law places supply fewer institutional certainties, and
thus, the path to economic value diverges to a greater extent into
the legal and political realms. For every degree a legal system is
marked by flexibility, it becomes that much more important to
approach the law entrepreneurially.
The law is an institution, and "institutional strategy is not so
much concerned with gaining competitive advantage based on
existing institutional structures as it is concerned with managing
those structures."4 48 Part IV turns to the subject of how legal
"[m]any legal uncertainties generate risks," but that these risks can be managed by
entrepreneurial lawyers).
447 Again, this article does not challenge the idea that legal engagement is costly.
See supra Part Ill.C (discussing legal flexibilities). But given that most jurisdictions in
the world are characterized by relatively high degrees of legal flexibility, the question for
the international firm is whether it must passively absorb these flexibilities as costs, or
whether some value may be extracted in return from them. This article suggests that
legal flexibilities, while sure to impose some costs, also supply the opportunity to
discover new economic value, particularly when the firm's rivals are not able to manage
legal flexibilities as well as the firm.
448 Paul Tracey & Nelson Phillips, Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets, 51
MGMT. INT'L REv. 23, 29 (2011) (quoting Thomas B. Lawrence, InstitutionalStrategy,
25 J. MGMT. 161, 167 (1999)).
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opportunities, once identified, are best exploited.
IV. Legal Entrepreneurship: How Advantages in the Law are
Secured
Part III revealed the general starting points in the firm's search
for legal competitive advantage.4 49 But how does the firm identify
How does the firm best pursue an
specific opportunities?
opportunity once identified? How can the firm know whether an
opportunity may potentially become a competitive advantage,
rather than a fleeting gain? Part IV begins to answer these
questions with a simple proposition: the firm needs an
entrepreneurial lawyer.
A. The ClassicalConception ofEntrepreneurship
Like many ideas discussed in this article, definitions of
"entrepreneurship" abound. Entrepreneurs are those who create
business opportunities45 0 by assuming the risks associated with
uncertainty.4 5' They "pursue opportunities without regard to the
resources they currently control."4 52
In economic terms,
"[e]ntrepreneurs are people who are on the alert for opportunities
and ready to exploit them by incurring transaction costs,"45
thereby overcoming "the constraints to exploiting new
knowledge." 45 4 For some scholars, the entrepreneur's primary
challenge is uncertainty; for others, it is innovation.4" Both are
"Uncertainty involves
crucial to the legal entrepreneur. 45 6
449 The exact manifestations of legal opportunities will vary, so familiarity with
local conditions is key. See, e.g., Robert E. Hoskisson et al., Strategy in Emerging
Economies, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 249, 259 (2000) ("The essence of emerging economies is
that they are dynamic and that it is necessary to take account of changes in the
institutional environment.").
450 Lu, supra note 444, at 3.
451

Id. at 14.

452 Terrence E. Brown, Per Davidsson & Johan Wiklund, An Operationalizationof
Stevenson's Conceptualization of Entrepreneurship as Opportunity-Based Firm
Behavior, 22 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 953, 954 (2001) (quoting Howard H. Stevenson & J.
Carlos Jarillo, A Paradigm of Entrepreneurship: Entrepreneurial Management, 11
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 17, 23 (1990)).
453 KASPER& STREIT, supra note 277, at 21.
454 Id. at 243.

455 Lu, supra note 444, at 15.
456 See infra Part IV.C (discussing legal entrepreneurship).
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imperfect information about changes." 45 7 Innovations can arise
from many sources, including unexpected occurrences,
incongruities between expectation and reality, and new
knowledge.45 8 Innovation "is the act that endows resources with a
new capacity to create wealth,"4 59 and begins with a scan for
potential opportunities-the firm must "go out to look, to ask, to
listen."460
Entrepreneurs are capable of spotting opportunities and acting
upon them.46 ' Opportunities may be recognized (if their existence
is obvious), discovered (if their existence is obscure), or created (if
the conditions necessary to the opportunity's existence can be
induced and brought together by design).46 2
Understandably, the entrepreneur traditionally has been
viewed as a creature of the economic realm, but "entrepreneurship
is by no means confined solely to economic institutions. 64
Entrepreneurs exist in a wide array of contexts," including
private, public, and social entrepreneurship; 4 65 political
entrepreneurship,46 6 of which judicial entrepreneurship is a

variant;4 67

cultural

entrepreneurship; 468

and

institutional

457

Lu, supra note 444, at 15.

458

DONALD F. KURATKO & RICHARD M. HODGETTS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP

156-57

(7th ed. 2007).
459

PETER F. DRUCKER, INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 30 (1985).

460 Id. at 135.
461 ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, Real Estate Transactions and Entrepreneurship, in
CREATIVITY, LAW AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 6, 13 (Shubah Ghosh & Robin Paul Malloy

eds., 2011).
462 S. Venkataraman & Saras D. Sarasvathy, Strategy and Entrepreneurship:
Outlines of an Untold Story, in THE BLACKWELL HANDBOOK

OF

STRATEGIC

MANAGEMENT 650, 653 (Michael A. Hitt, R. Edward Freedman & Jeffery S. Harrison
eds., 2001).
463

DRUCKER, supra note 459, at 23.

464 See generally ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN CONTEXT (Marco van Gelderen & Enno

Masurel eds., 2011) (exploring the various contexts of entrepreneurship).
465

MALLOY, supra note 461, at 12.

466 Political entrepreneurs are "people and agencies who seek political advantage
from implementing or hindering institutional change." KASPER & STREIT, supra note
277, at 403; accordEUGENE LEWIS, PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP 9 (1980).
467

See WAYNE V. MCINTOSH & CYNTHIA L. CATES, JUDICIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP

xiv (1997).
468 Michael Lounsbury & Mary Ann Glynn, Cultural Entrepreneurship:Stories,
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entrepreneurship. 469 Part IV.C, infra, describes and distinguishes
legal entrepreneurship, but we should first briefly consider why
entrepreneurship is relevant to our subject at all.
B. The Law as a Competitive Marketplace
The law is a misperceived idea. Law has been romanticized, at
least in the West, as a special realm somehow exempt from the
rules applicable elsewhere. 47 0 Firms ought to view the law for
what it is: a marketplace. In some respects, the legal market47' is
distinguishable from the economic realm; law's distinguished
social role necessitates some distinguishing features. But the law
nevertheless remains a marketplace. 472 Like any other market, the
legal market requires an entrepreneurial approach to achieve
lasting value.
"Basic differences among legal systems make multinational
legal planning and compliance extremely difficult."4 "
The
challenges facing global firms "require attorneys to think more
comprehensively and creatively about their work," and "[t]his shift
in thinking has less to do with the traditional tools of legal analysis
(such as interpreting statutes, rules, and judicial opinions) than
with developing a broader perspective on the interaction of
different legal, economic, and political systems.
Clearly
globalization is making the work of business lawyers everywhere
increasingly ... multidisciplinary."4 74
This multidisciplinary

Legitimacy, andthe Acquisition ofResources, 22 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 545 (2001).

469 See infra Part IV.D.2 (discussing institutional entrepreneurship at greater
length).
470 There are exceptions-for example, law and economics shows how economic
insights can apply to legal phenomena. But this Article's concern is somewhat different:
firms must first perceive the law correctly before they can achieve legal competitive
advantage.
471 The phrase "legal market" colloquially describes the legal realm as an industry
(e.g., the business of running a law firm). The phrase is employed very differently in this
article. Here, a "legal market" is the total space of a jurisdiction's rule of law process, as
described in Part III.B. The legal market is a regulatory zone in which firms can
compete to establish advantages, which are then exploited to the firm's economic
benefit.
See also infra Part IV.C. I (distinguishing the meanings of "legal
entrepreneurship").
472 See supra note 471 and accompanying text.
473 Frenkel, supranote 56, at 145.
474 Id. at 158; see also supra Part III.B (arguing that the rule of law should be
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exercise, if effectively executed, is legal entrepreneurship.
Managers are challenged "to accurately define the existing
boundaries and structure of [their] competitive arena .... "5475
Similarly, an entrepreneur's "creativity requires both an
understanding of current boundaries and recognition of a
possibility for setting new boundaries." 476 The entrepreneurial
lawyer must accurately define the boundaries of her competitive
arena.477 Some domains are better defined than others.47 8 In the
traditional economic realm, a "competitive arena may be as broad
as an industry or as narrow as a product market." 4 79 The precise
contours of a legal market can be difficult to describe as they
differ by jurisdiction, time, and by the firm's unique position
within the jurisdiction.48 0 The legal market must ultimately be
defined as expansively as is necessary to harness the particular
flexibilities of interest. This expansiveness can encapsulate all of
the realms of the rule of law process-legal, political, economic,
and cultural.4 8 '
As a regulatory institution, the law defines the boundaries of
legitimate activity within the economic sphere. 48 2 To the extent
that the legal realm's own boundaries are undefined, the political
apparatus must attempt to define the legal realm ad hoc, or else its
boundaries are left wholly fluid and transaction costs ensue
unabated.483 In low rule of law jurisdictions, legal flexibilities
viewed as a process involving the jurisdiction's economic, political, and cultural
systems).
475 Day, supra note 113, at 23.
476 MALLOY, supra note 461, at 13-14.
477 See Marco van Gelderen, Karen Verduyn & Enno Masurel, Introduction to
'Entrepreneurship in Context,' in ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN CONTEXT 1 (Marco van
Gelderen & Enno Masurel eds., 2012) (arguing that many dynamic contexts exist for any
entrepreneurial venture and that context is important to fully understanding
entrepreneurship); see also supra Part I1I.B (providing that the legal entrepreneur's
context will extend beyond the legal realm because the rule of law is a process involving
areas beyond the legal sphere).
478 Day, supra note 113, at 24.
479 Id. at 25.
480 See generally infra note 513 and accompanying text (implying that "predicting
emerging opportunities" is difficult due to the "law's shifting landscape").
481 See supra Part I1.B.
482 DixIT, supra note 287, at 1-2.
483 See supra Part I1.F.
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preclude the creation of clear and reliable boundaries for the legal
sphere.484 In this case, the firm itself must proactively define its
position within the legal nebula.485 This is the purpose of legal
entrepreneurship and is the driver of legal competitive advantage.
Regulators are constrained in responding to the firm's legal
maneuvering.48 6 Regulators must consider the legal system's goals
and context, as well as its inertia and incumbent beneficiaries. In
response to the firm, regulators may make the law more complex
or simple, but this often unwittingly creates new opportunities for
the firm's legal advantage.48 7 Often, the firm's legal maneuvering
will draw no response whatsoever-regulators may not care about
the firm's activity, may lack the resources (including information)
to respond, or may decline to respond because the opportunity cost
is too high (too many more pressing issues exist).4 88
Competing in the legal market is a necessity for international
firms. The law can be an immense source of competitive
advantage as it impacts the firm's access to, and performance in,
the economic sphere. 48 9 Firms that do not compete in the legal
market yield to their rivals this vast and largely untapped set of
opportunities. Unless one's firm is a law firm, investing time and
energy in the legal realm is merely a means to an end: the firm
engages the legal realm to further its economic profitability.49 0

484 See supra Part III.D.
485 Where states do not make firms secure in their pursuit of wealth, other forces
will intervene. DIXIT, supra note 287, at 4; see also Oliver E. Williamson, The Theory of
the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 171,
174 (2002) (explaining that private ordering emerges as an alternative to costly and
unreliable judicial resolution of conflicts, particular in the presence of bounded
rationality, opportunism and idiosyncratic knowledge). Even then, however, the state
must supply basic order. Christopher Clague et al., Institutions and Economic
Performance: Property Rights and Contract Enforcement, in INSTITUTIONS AND
ECONOMic DEVELOPMENT 67, 69-70 (Christopher Clague ed., 1997).
486 See Masson, supra note 252, at 33-38.
487 Id. at 36.
488 See Masson, supra note 252, at 33-38.
489 See supra Part III.E (explaining the relationship between laws and valuecreating activities).
490

See supraPart III.E.
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C. The EntrepreneurialLawyer
1. The Meaning ofLegal Entrepreneurship
A Google search of the term "legal entrepreneur" returns
roughly a dozen results. The terms "legal entrepreneur" and "legal
entrepreneurship," though not widely used, do exist, and refer to
the lawyer who becomes entrepreneurial to better manage a legal
business.49 ' Thus, for example, in popular usage, a "legal
entrepreneur" entrepreneurially recruits clients for a law firm.492
These websites originate from the United States and the United
Kingdom, so their shared view of legal entrepreneurship is
understandable. Attorneys in high rule of law jurisdictions are not
thinking along the lines proposed here.49 3
The term "entrepreneurial lawyer" means something very
different in this article. Here, entrepreneurship is applied not to
the business of law, but to the practice of law. Our framework is
concerned not with recruiting clients, but with how best to achieve
strategic outcomes for the client-in particular, how to harness the
law to the client's competitive advantage. This is accomplished
by identifying and exploiting the legal flexibilities in Part III.C.

491 See, e.g., Mike O'Horo, Are You an Entrepreneurial Attorney?,
ATTORNEYATWORK (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.attomeyatwork.com/are-you-anentrepreneurial-attorney/ (advocating for the management of small law offices as one
would manage any other small business); Cara DiSisto Verwholt, Case Study: A Legal
Entrepreneur Builds a Boutique Practice,INOVIA (Dec. 1, 2011), http://info.inovia.com/
2011/12/case-study-a-legal-entrepreneur-builds-a-boutique-practice/ (discussing a big
law attorney who opened her own boutique law firm); Patrick J. Lamb, Eight Qualities of
a New Normal Legal Entrepreneur, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Sept. 4, 2012),

http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/the-new-normal legal-entrepreneur
(discussing traits of lawyers who leave established law firms to start new law firms);
Ronald H. Gruner, A Call for Legal Entrepreneurship,VALLEX FUND (Jan. 8, 2008),
http://www.vallexfund.com/download/LegalEntrepreneurship.pdf (urging reforms to the
business

model

of

the

legal

industry);

THE

LEGAL

ENTREPRENEUR,

http://legalentrepreneur.net/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2013) (discussing business topics such
as

law firm

advertising

and

law office

cash

flows);

ENTREPRENEURLAWYER,

http://entrepreneurlawyer.co.uk/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2013) (advising law firms on how
to increase revenues).
492 See Lamb, supra note 491 (stressing the use of unorthodox strategies for legal
success when starting a new law firm).
493 See generally supra Part II.D (providing that other literature assumes a high rule
of law context).
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Uncertainty makes entrepreneurship possible,494 and legal
flexibilities spawn legal uncertainties. 495 Legal entrepreneurship
is best viewed as the process of achieving a distinctive, sustainable
position in the economic market (that is, a competitive advantage)
by the deliberate and innovative exploitation of one or more legal
flexibilities.
2. The Nature ofLegal Entrepreneurship
Scholars have recognized that political and regulatory changes
can create entrepreneurial opportunities in the economic sphere,
but do not consider entrepreneurial opportunities in the law
itself.49 6 This article proposes something more: attorneys can
apply the entrepreneur's fundamental skills to the unique
circumstances of the legal market, harnessing legal flexibilities
and the linkages between law and strategy to craft competitive
advantages. While this view expands the role of the traditional
Western counsel,49 7 global legal leaders are already redefining
their position, for "[c]ourage in international business is the virtue
of daring to invent and innovate, abandoning old business ... and
pioneering new products and markets, as [the] entrepreneur"
does.4 98 In an era of highly specialized law practice, this may be a
difficult balance to achieve. Still, chief legal officers, legal
strategists, and other legal executives should strive to achieve it.
These ideas are not entirely foreign to the West. For example,
Edelman urges that "[f]aws [containing] vague ... language ...
and laws that provide weak enforcement mechanisms leave more
room for organizational mediation than laws that are more
specific, substantive, and backed by strong enforcement." 4 99 Karl

494

WILLIAM BYGRAVE & ANDREW ZACHARAKIS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP 57 (2008).

495 See supra Part III.C.
496 See, e.g., SHANE, supra note 275, at 25-28 (asserting that deregulation may
allow for activities previously prohibited).
497 See supra Part I (discussing the prevailing views of Western managers and
lawyers).
498 PANOS MOURDOUKOUTAS, BUSINESS STRATEGY IN A SEMIGLOBAL ECONOMY 82

(2006).
499 Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational
Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. Soc. 1531, 1532 (1992). Edelman was
concerned with the variability of laws within a single high rule of law jurisdiction. Id.

The model proposed here adds two new dimensions: variability across jurisdictions and

402

N.C. J. INT'L L. &COM. REG.

Vol. XXXIX

Llewellyn observed that "[the lawyer's] eye ... is on manipulating
the machinery of the rules for what that machinery can be made to
yield.""oo Even in the United States, "[a]n advocate . . . has as his
trade to exploit . .. the uttermost leeway of the available lines of
respectable, honorable, persuasive argument afforded by our going
legal order,"so' so "a case can hope to stand for anything it
says .... [And yet] a case can [also] hope to be distinguished
down to its narrowest facts and issue."502 George Stigler notes that
firms everywhere seek regulatory benefits.50 3 And Douglass North
observes that even in high rule of law places, "[t]o the degree that
there are large payoffs to influencing the rules and their
enforcement, it will pay to create" lobbies.504 Although the
international realm adds new complexities to business, not all
dimensions of foreign legal systems are foreign to Western
attorneys. The framework proposed here incorporates some of
these Western experiences in addition to addressing the more
prominent legal features of low rule of law places."0 '
Even in high rule of law jurisdictions, "spending more
resources on litigation" may result in better "outcomes for the
spenders. If law operated in accord with conventional legal
theory, resources would affect results only in the small minority of
cases in which determinative facts remained undiscovered or the
result specified by law was unclear. Yet, resources consistently
produce good or acceptable results .. ..
This phenomenon is
magnified in lower rule of law jurisdictions, where legitimate
avenues beyond litigation exist for lawyers to influence legal
outcomes.5 07 Legal investments, then, are best made by the
retention of entrepreneurial lawyers.0 s
the existence of systemic flexibilities.
500 LLEWELLYN, supra note 128, at 119.
501 Id. In lower rule of law environments, the boundaries of "respectable"
argument may assume very different contours.
502 Id. at 124-25.

503 Mitnick, supranote 65, at 74-75.
504 NORTH, supra note 124, at 87.

505 See supra Parts 11I.C-D.
506 LoPucki & Weyrauch, supra note 343, at 84.
507 See supra Part III.C.
508 "The ability to turn legal resources ... into legal advantage requires a certain
level of capability within the [firm]." Masson, supra note 2, at 102. The model in this
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A business's value will ordinarily be assessed by traditional
The value added by an entrepreneurial lawyer can be
methods.'
more difficult to assess because demonstrating causality is a
convoluted exercise in the presence of myriad variables. The law
can be an immense source of competitive advantage to the extent
that it impacts the firm's access to or performance in the economic
sphere relative to its rivals. To accurately assess the value of an
entrepreneurial lawyer, the firm must be able to attribute a certain
financial success (or some portion of it) to a particular legal
advantage. Legal advantage is often necessary, but rarely is
sufficient alone, to generate economic value. Once the firm has
access to an economic advantage, it must still perform on the
"business side" to create value.
What it means to actually exploit a legal opportunity depends
upon the nature of the opportunity. For a substantive flexibility,
the lawyer must persuade authorities to embrace the firm's
interpretation of the law, or at least not to object to the firm's
activities."'o For an enforcement flexibility, the lawyer must
determine when the firm can act expansively."' As to systemic
flexibilities, the lawyer must perceive the influence of extra-legal
forces.512 The entrepreneurial lawyer systematically seeks out
advantages through these flexibilities, manages them, and attempts
to predict emerging opportunities within the law's shifting
landscape.5 13

article does not assume that legal opportunities are equally available to firms. In low
rule of law environments, it is possible to create an opportunity unique to one's firm.
Thus, the ultimate
This requires entrepreneurial prowess in the legal sphere.
differentiator between most firms is whether they employ entrepreneurial lawyers, and if
so, their respective skills. Masson concluded that "it is still likely the case that certain
characteristics of law itself, such as predictability, continue to play an important role."
Id. at 115. We fully agree. See supraPart III (discussing these characteristics).
509 These include the book value, price to earnings ratio, discounted cash flow,
return on investment, and liquidation value methods. KURATKO & HODGETTS, supra note
458, at 668-75.
510 See supra Part III.C.I.
511 See supra Part III.C.2.
512 See supra Part III.C.3.
513 See R. Duane Ireland & Justin W. Webb, Strategic Entrepreneurship:Creating
Competitive Advantage Through Streams ofInnovation, 50 Bus. HORIZONs 49, 50 (2007)
(stating that strategic entrepreneurship builds for future advantages).
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3. The EntrepreneurialLawyer as an Institutional
Entrepreneur
The law is a regulatory institution.5 14 Thus, legal flexibilities
are a type of institutional void, which occur "where [the]
institutional arrangements that support markets are absent [or]
weak."' Institutions "matter for markets; they enable and support
market activity. Where such institutions are absent or weak, . . .
scholars point to the presence of 'institutional voids,' realities that
can impact market formation, economic growth, and
development.""' Institutional voids also "result from the conflict,
collision and shift among existing institutions."5 17
Institutional entrepreneurs capitalize upon institutional
voids."' "[I]nstitutional entrepreneurship ... encompasses the
continuous ... re-combination and re-deployment of different
practices, organizational forms, physical resources, and
institutions."5 1 9 Thus, the "[e]xploitation of the regulative
uncertainty and the weak rules of laws has arguably become an
important form of entrepreneurship" in jurisdictions like China.520
Institutionalization is a matter of degree,52 1 and thus, opportunities
514 See supra Part II.B.
515 Mair & Marti, supra note 19, at 419. Institutional voids exist outside of the law
as well. Firms must "acknowledg[e] the existence of multiple institutional logics and ...
the points at which these logics come together." Johanna Mair, Ignasi Marti & Marc J.
Ventresca, Building Inclusive Markets in Rural Bangladesh: How Intermediaries Work
Institutional Voids, 55 ACAD. MGMT. J. 819, 842 (2012).

516 Mair, Marti & Ventresca, supra note 515, at 819-20.
517 Mair & Marti, supra note 19, at 430.
518

E.g., KHANNA & PALEPU, supra note 212, at 53 (stating that institutional voids

can frustrate firms, "[b]ut they can also be a source of advantage for those companies ...
that have local knowledge, privileged access to resources, or other capabilities that can
help substitute for missing market institutions. Because institutional voids impose costs
on market participants, entrepreneurial ventures that seek to fill these voids can create
significant value"); Tracey & Phillips, supra note 448, at 24; Webb et al., supra note 16,
at 498 (discussing institutional incongruence). Perhaps the most eloquent and full
discussion is Keming Yang's masterful work, Entrepreneurshipin China. See YANG,
supra note 89, at 49 (discussing institutional voids from the sociological perspective and
the resulting phenomenon of double entrepreneurship).
519 Mair & Marti, supra note 19, at 431.
520 Nir Kshetri, Institutional Changes Affecting Entrepreneurship in China, 12 J.
DEv. ENTREPRENEURSHIP 415, 423 (2007).

521 Tracey & Phillips, supra note 448, at 28.
exists in degrees. See supra Part III.B.

Correspondingly, the rule of law
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for institutional entrepreneurship exist in degrees.522 Institutions
are of such great importance because "[i]nstitutions, together with
the standard constraints of economic theory, determine the
opportunities in a society."52 3
When "structural overlaps between spheres expose actors to
multiple institutional logics," "[s]uch logics can be [viewed] as
'toolkits' . . . ."524 Institutional logics reflect cultural expectations
about "the appropriate means to achieve a given goal in an
When institutions promote multiple
institutional sphere."S25
contradictory logics, actors must navigate the institutional
contradictions and can benefit from them.526 Legal ambiguities are
Though legal
analogous to institutional contradictions.
flexibilities may not be contradictions per se (they can be "mere"
uncertainties), legal flexibilities present similar opportunities for
entrepreneurial initiative.52 7
Entrepreneurship in "informal economies" can involve
Although the
activities that are clearly illegalized.52 8
entrepreneurial lawyer may encounter such situations, most
flexibilities do not present clear opportunities to contradict the
law. When the law itself is not reasonably clear, it is difficult for
one's activity to constitute an express violation of it.
It seems, then, that the entrepreneurial lawyer proposed here is,
in many respects, similar to the literature's institutional
entrepreneur.
This is unsurprising since "[t]he kinds of
information and knowledge required by the entrepreneur are in
good part a consequence of a particular institutional context." 5 29
Nevertheless, one noteworthy departure from the literature exists.
Most scholars define the institutional entrepreneur as one who
522 Tracey & Phillips, supra note 448, at 28.
523 NORTH, supra note 124, at 7.
524 Toke Bjerregaard & Jakob Lauring, Entrepreneurshipas Institutional Change:
Strategies of BridgingInstitutional Contradictions,9 EUR. MGMT. REv. 31, 33 (2012).
525 Id.
526 Id.
527 See supra Part 111.
528 Webb et al., supra note 16, at 492.
529 NORTH, supra note 124, at 77; accord Peng, Wang & Jiang, supra note 22, at
931 ("In terms. of practical benefits, an institutions-based view can help firms in
emerging economies enhance their competitiveness . . .. They need to know more about
the rules of the game abroad that may be different from the familiar rules at home.").
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creates new institutions altogether, often destroying existing
institutions in the process.530 Classic institutional entrepreneurship
may require the destruction of existing norms."'
But legal
entrepreneurship, while allowing for such events, does not require
them. Legal entrepreneurship serves to further the firm's goals
within the economic realm and is not an exercise for its own
sake.532 Thus, legal entrepreneurship involves innovation, the
joining together of unique resources, opportunity recognition,
creativity, and so forth-many of the characteristics associated
with economic entrepreneurship--but it need not also involve
institutional destruction.
In the institutional context,
"[o]pportunities can be viewed as the likelihood that an
organizational field will permit actors to identify and introduce a
novel institutional combination and facilitate the mobilization of
the resources required to make it enduring."533 This describes the
entrepreneurial lawyer more aptly than one who necessarily
creates or destroys existing legal institutions.
Of course firms can seek to change the content of the law,534
but optimal legal outcomes are often realized without the expense

530 See, e.g., Rasha Nasra & M. Tina Dacin, Institutional Arrangements and
International Entrepreneurship: The State as Institutional Entrepreneur, 34
ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THEORY & PRACTICE 583, 595 (2010); Julie Battilana, Bernard Leca
& Eva Boxenbaum, How Actors Change Institutions: Towards a Theory of Institutional
Entrepreneurship, 3 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 65, 68 (2009); David Levy & Maureen
Scully, The InstitutionalEntrepreneuras Modern Prince: The Strategic Face of Power
in Contested Fields, 28 ORG. STUD. 971, 972 (2007); Alistair Mutch, Reflexivity and the
Institutional Entrepreneur:A HistoricalExploration, 28 ORG. STUD. 1123, 1124 (2007);
David Daokui Li, Junxin Feng & Hongping Jiang, InstitutionalEntrepreneurs, 96 AM.
Eco. REV. 358, 361 (2006); Fr6ddrique D6jean, Jean-Pascal Gond & Bernard Leca,
Measuring the Unmeasured: An Institutional Entrepreneur Strategy in an Emerging
Industry, 57 HUMAN RELATIONS 741, 742 (2004). A few exceptions exist, e.g., Tracey &
Phillips, supra note 448, at 29 (asserting that institutional entrepreneurship involves
"deliberately leveraging resources in order to create and/or manipulate the institutional
structures in which they are embedded") (emphasis added).
531 Li, Feng & Jiang, supra 530, at 358.
532 See supra Part IV.B.
533 Silvia Dorado, Institutional Entrepreneurship,Partaking and Convening, 26
ORG. STUD. 385, 391 (2005).
534 Bagley, supra note 62, at 590; see also Keim, supra note 21, at 585 (urging
firms to intervene in the public policy process since policy often impacts the firm's
opportunities).
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of lobbying for such changes."'5 It often is preferable for the law's
substance to remain exactly as the firm finds it, as "fixes" to the
law frequently will benefit rivals as much as the firm. Depending
upon their nature and extent, legalflexibilities can serve the same
function as would changes to the law's substance.53 6
Indeed, the entire notion of competitive advantage consists of
those things a firm can do that its rivals cannot.5 37 When a law's
flexibilities accommodate the firm's interests, changes to the law
are not only unnecessary, but are affirmatively undesirable, for
changes ordinarily have only two possible outcomes: to clarify
that the firm's advantage under the former law no longer exists
(that it lacked legitimacy) or to clarify that the firm's former
advantage must be extended to its rivals (because it was
legitimate). In either case, the firm loses its advantage.5 38 A legal
flexibility is valueless until it is actually harnessed by the firm,53 9
but a clarification to the law might guarantee the new value
equally.540 For all of their costs, flexible institutions allow for
individual advantages without necessitating the institutions'
destruction;54 ' equilibrium and stability are thereby preserved. In
535 Masson, supra note 2, at 114.
536 See generally supra Part Ill.C (discussing the three types of legal flexibilities
and how the firm can strategically harness them).
537 See supra Part II.A.
538 The only exception is where a change to the law explicitly favors the individual
firm in question. Ordinarily such a change is procured at great expense (through
lobbying) and may be questioned on grounds of legitimacy.
539 THOMAS L. WHEELEN & J. DAVID HUNGER, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND

BUSINESS POLICY 109 (9th ed. 2004) ("An opportunity by itself has no real value unless a
company has the capacity (i.e., resources) to take advantage of [it].").
540 See Roger A. Kerin, P. Rajan Varadarajan & Robert A. Peterson, First-Mover
Advantage: A Synthesis, Conceptual Framework, and Research Propositions,56 J. MKT.
33, 47 (1992) (arguing that a new advantage will soon dissipate if the firm's rivals are
free riders); infra Part IV.D.2 (discussing first mover advantages).
541 Claus Offe, Designing Institutions in East European Transitions, in THE
THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 199, 208-09 (Robert E. Goodwin ed., 1996) (arguing

that this is accomplished by defining the scope of discretionary behavior among relevant
actors and by providing institutional rules for changing lower-order rules); accord
Robert S. Gerstein, The PracticeofFidelity to Law, in COMPLIANCE AND THE LAW 35, 37
(Samuel Krislov et al. eds., 1972) (discussing H.L.A. Hart's distinction between primary
and secondary rules, in which primary rules are the rules applying to the populace as a
whole, while secondary rules are "rules which authorize the creation, change,
interpretation, and enforcement of the primary rules").
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high rule of law jurisdictions, lobbying is often the only legitimate
response to an adverse policy.5 42 In low rule of law jurisdictions,
favorable legal positions can be achieved legitimately without
changing the law itself and without extending the favorable
position to rivals.543
4. The EntrepreneurialLawyer's Skill Set
Modem global counsel are most effective when they possess
fluency in cross-cultural lawyering, work effectively in teams and
with outside counsel, and manage risk well.5 4 4 Global counsel
must embrace persistent problem-solving, opportunity orientation,
tolerance for ambiguity and failure, calculated risk-taking,
creativity, and innovativeness.5 45 But above all, global counsel
must be entrepreneurial.
The entrepreneurial lawyer can recognize opportunities in the
law.5 46 This turns, in part, upon why states regulate: to address
information inadequacies, minimize externalities, assure the
availability of services, prevent anti-competitive behavior,
promote public goods and public morals, remedy unequal
bargaining power, ease scarcity, promote justice and social policy,
and to generally plan.5 47 Two additional motives for regulation
exist: to promote the concerns of powerful private interests and to
promote the concerns of political incumbents.548 Just as firms
must manage the uncertainties they find in the law, states seek to
regulate uncertainties and thereby manage societal risk. The better
the lawyer understands officials' motives, the better the starting

542 See generally supra Part III.A (discussing high and low rule of law
jurisdictions).
543 See generally supra Parts III and IV.
544 Frenkel, supra note 56, at 160-64.
545 KURATKO & HODGETTS, supra note 458, at 118-25.

546 SHANE, supra note 275, at 45 ("In general, people discover opportunities that
others do not identify for two reasons: first, they have better access to information about
the existence of the opportunity.
Second, they... have superior cognitive
capabilities.").
547 BALDWIN & CAVE, supra note 39, at 9-16.

548 The first and most fundamental priority of any political incumbent is survival.
See, e.g., Li Ma, A Comparison of the Legitimacy of Power Between Confucianist and
Legalist Philosophies, 10 ASIAN PHIL. 49, 50 (2000) ("Even before seeking the common
good, the first objective of power is to continue to exist . . . .").
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point she will have to anticipate and identify opportunities for
legal advantage.54 9
The entrepreneurial lawyer must be culturally astute, or
"globally literate.""'o "Global literacy is a state of seeing,
thinking, acting, and mobilizing in culturally mindful ways."5 '
Globally literate leaders are one of the scarcest resources in
international business today.552 Thus, the entrepreneurial lawyer
must work effectively outside of the legal system, in the other
realms of the rule of law process.
The entrepreneurial lawyer develops relationships with legal
decision-makers, particularly in lower rule of law environments.55 3
A "key aspect of institutional entrepreneurship in emerging
markets is the capacity of actors to build networks and
alliances . .

. ."55

The institutional entrepreneur is a skilled social

549 See generally Allison F. Kingsley et al., Political Markets and Regulatory
Uncertainty: Insights and Implicationsfor Integrated Strategy, 26 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP.
52 (2012) (offering a brilliant framework for predicting regulatory uncertainties and for
integrating such predictions into the firm's strategy). This framework views regulatory
uncertainty through the lens of the political market and the corresponding demand and
supply sides of regulation. On average, regulations contain the fewest uncertainties
where the firm's opponents are motivated by efficiency rather than by ideology, and
where competition exists among regulatory authorities. Id. at 57. The entrepreneurial
lawyer would do well to study this framework as she attempts to predict emerging
sources of regulatory uncertainty.
550 See generally ROSEN, supra note 324 (giving the four global literacies and their
importance in the business environment).
551

Id. at 57.

552 Id. at 25 ("We have a shortage of global leaders at a time when international
exposure and experience are vital to business success.").
553 See generally Eric W.K. Tsang, Can Guanxi be a Source of Sustained
Competitive Advantagefor Doing Business in China?, 12 ACAD. MGMT. EXEC. 64 (1998)
(arguing that in China, for example, a firm's personal relations can serve as a source of
competitive advantage); HONG Liu, CHINESE BUSINESS 50-51 (2009) (arguing that the

firm's guanxi can help it around a regulatory barrier and that if the firm has "connections
with top central government officials, any legal and regulatory hurdles can be
surmounted"); Peter Peverelli & Lynda Jiwen Song, Social Capital as Networks of
Networks, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN CONTEXT 116 (Marco van Gelderen & Enno Masurel

eds., 2012) (arguing that social capital, the "sum of the potential access to resources an
entrepreneur accumulates in social networks," is a key driver of entrepreneurial success
in places such as China); Elliot Carlisle & Dave Flynn, Small Business Survival in
China: Guanxi, Legitimacy, and Social Capital, 10 J. DEv. ENTREPRENEURSHIP 79

(2004) (illustrating the importance of personal relations to entrepreneurs).
554 Tracey & Phillips, supra note 448, at 29.

410

N.C. J. INT'L L. &COM. REG.

Vol. XXXIX

actor,"' for legal theory will always yield to political reality when
power is at stake.556
These skills are also crucial to the
entrepreneurial lawyer.117 "The interaction between business and
government is an interaction between people," so "it is important
to understand the institutional setting in which decision-makers
operate.""'
Legal decision-makers are in essence the
entrepreneurial lawyer's "customers," and "firms can achieve a
competitive advantage by influencing consumers' preferences
rather than responding to them.""'
The degree to which
entrepreneurs have access to a jurisdiction's elite can profoundly
influence their likelihood of success.56 0 Gaining such access
requires cultural astuteness."' Other things equal, an entrepreneur
can lower transaction costs as his reputation grows.562
Acquiring and interpreting information are also vital skills. 563
Managers' key functions "are all tasks in which there is
uncertainty and in which ... information must be acquired." 564
Information is necessary to lowering both costs and risks. The
entrepreneurial lawyer can lower transaction costs 56 5 with the right
555 Mair & Marti, supra note 19, at 421 ("Recent work has also accentuated the
imagery of the institutional entrepreneur as a skilled actor.").
556 See supra Part III.C.2 (noting, in the context of enforcement flexibilities, that
law enforcers' self-interest, as well as their desire to shape legal rules, can lead to a
divergence between the law in theory and the law as it enforced through the coercive
power of the state).
557 C.S. Tseng & M.J. Foster, A Flexible Response to Guo Qing: Experience of
Three MNCs Entering Restricted Sectors of the PRC Economy, 5 ASIAN Bus. & MGMT.
315, 319 (2006) (noting that most successful foreign firms in China excel by developing
relationships with key legal authorities, using legal gaps to their advantage, or both).
558 Keim, supra note 21, at 595.
559 Kerin, Varadarajan & Peterson, supra note 540, at 35.

560 See RIGGS, supra note 269, at 142-49.
561 See generally RICHARD M. STEERS, CAROLS J. SANCHEZ-RUNDE & LUCIARA
NARDON, MANAGEMENT ACROSS CULTURES (2010) (providing an outstanding overview

of the cultural challenges that business leaders confront). .
562

ALBERT BRETON & RONALD WINTROBE, THE LOGIC OF BUREAUCRATIC CONDUCT

123-26 (1982).
563 The cost of acquiring political information varies by firm; hence, the amount of
data it is rational to collect will also vary by firm. See ANTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIC
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 236 (1957). The firm's ability to use political information

hinges on its contextual knowledge. Id. at 234.
564

NORTH, supra note 124, at 77.

565 See Dew, supra note 162, at 20 (arguing that institutional entrepreneurs
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kinds of information-both "skill-based" information (legal
knowledge), as well as unique factual knowledge that is not
widely publicized (obtained through one's connections)."
Global counsel must be sophisticated risk managers56-a skill
correlated with entrepreneurship.5 68 The entrepreneurial lawyer
can benefit by collaborating with others on risk management.56 9
Many legal uncertainties generate risks. But uncertainty and risk
can be reduced through the firm's own entrepreneurial initiative;
thus, uncertainty "will affect [the firm] only to the extent that
managerial resources are unavailable to deal with it." 7 o
Not all uncertainties constitute risks, 7 though many do.5 72
Legal risk is a function of the potential sanctions that might
accompany a given course of action (or inaction)5 " as well as the
level of performance that a rule demands from the firm. 574 The
entrepreneurial lawyer manages these risks through continuous
learning and refinement. 57 5 "Entrepreneurship is 'risky' mainly
because so few of the so-called entrepreneurs know what they are
doing. They lack the methodology. They violate elementary and
But ... entrepreneurship need not be
well-known rules ....
'high-risk' . . . .

[I]t

needs

to

be

based

on

purposeful

innovation."5 76
effectively act with the goal of reducing transaction costs).
566 See supra note 545 and accompanying text.
567 Frenkel, supra note 56, at 159.
568 Lu, supra note 444, at 14 (stating that entrepreneurs assume the risks associated
with uncertainty).
569 See Saad Laraqui, Road Map to the Changing Financial Environment, in
BORDERLESS BUSINESS 235, 236-39, 253 (Clarence J. Mann & Klaus Gotz eds., 2006)

(urging that regulations impact transactional risks, that finance managers can help to
mitigate these risks, and that legal counsel can help finance managers as well).
570 EDITH T. PENROSE, THE THEORY OF THE GROWTH OF THE FIRM 58 (M.E. Sharpe,

Inc. 1980).
571 See generally Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms, 75
Eco. 643 (1961).

Q. J.

572

Id.

573

BALDWIN & CAVE, supra note 39, at 100 (showing that these might include

criminal prosecution, fines, and warnings).
574 Id. at 120-23 (discussing levels of performance).
575 See generally BALDWIN & CAVE, supra note 39 (discussing the structure of
regulatory systems and how to navigate them).
576

DRUCKER, supra note 459, at 29.
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The entrepreneurial lawyer must be flexible and adaptive
since, by definition, uncertainty pervades his environment.5 77 This
is particularly true in lower rule of law jurisdictions, where higher
degrees, more complex combinations, and more varied sources of
uncertainty exist.578
D. The Law as a Source of Competitive Advantage
1. SustainabilityofLegal Competitive Advantages
Most prior discussions of the law's role in competitive
advantage take for granted the "high rule of law."57 9 Under these
conditions, "the law" is taken to mean unambiguous rules that are
consistently enforced and equally applied to everyone, and thus
the nature of "legal advantage" is limited to lawyers who know the
(well-defined) rules, accept their (well-defined) boundaries, and
attempt to innovate within their (well-defined) contours.'
From
the standpoint of legal innovation, the high rule of law
environment is a uni-dimensional, relatively small space;"' high
rule of law institutions supply firms with constants rather than
with variables along most of the system's relevant parameters.58 2
The practical trouble is that most of the world does not operate
under high rule of law conditions. 83 Most international firms will
encounter conditions far More flexible. The global entrepreneurial
lawyer works in a series of multi-dimensional spaces.5 84
If all jurisdictions adhered to the Coasian ideal of
unambiguous, equally applied, and well-enforced laws, there

577

SHANE, supra note 275, at 213.

578 See generally supra Part III (discussing the definition of rule of law and the
distinctions between high and low rule of law jurisdictions).
579 See supra Part II.D.
580 See supra Part II.D.
581 This is not to say that high rule of law jurisdictions lack complexity. Many
areas of law in high rule of law jurisdictions are more complex than in lower rule of law
jurisdictions. But in high rule of law jurisdictions, fewer dimensions are deemed to be
"legitimate" areas of lawyerly involvement, and fewer are amenable to strategic
exploitation. Legal flexibilities are scarcer in high rule of law jurisdictions. See supra
Part Ill.D.
582 See supra Part Ill.D.
583 See supra Part III.D.
584 See supra Part IV.C (discussing the entrepreneurial lawyer).
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would exist very few opportunities for legal competitive
advantage, even though specific legal rules differ greatly from
place to place."' This follows from the nature of high rule of law
systems: once a lawyer successfully innovates, the high rule of
law system will, by definition, institutionalize the new
maneuver-will, by definition, legitimize the innovation,
memorializing it and making it available equally to all firms. 86
Legal advantages crafted in high rule of law environments are
ephemeral, for they quickly become transparent and imitable."'
The essence of competitive advantage is a condition favorable
to the firm that is simultaneously outside the reach of its
competitors." If the law is to represent a sustainable source of
competitive advantage, the advantage must exist in some feature
of the legal system other than "lawyers competing on an equal
plane." The advantage, whatever its nature or source, must not be
easily imitable.
"Causal ambiguity creates barriers to imitation."59 0 In other
585 Greater variations do in fact continue to exist in the substance of laws from
place to place. See supra Part II.D. Legal arbitrage might remain viable under the
Coasian ideal, but legal competitive advantageswould not.
586 See, e.g., LoPucki & Weyrauch, supra note 343, at 80 (explaining that
successful legal strategies in the United States are almost always copied because "the
moves that execute the strategy are usually disclosed in public hearings or on public
records" such that "[c]areful observers can piece them together"). In high rule of law
jurisdictions, "[e]ven strategies never publicly disclosed or admitted are nearly always in
some manner revealed to sufficiently observant opponents."
Id. Ultimately, if
opponents cannot discredit the strategy, then "the legal system recognizes the triumph of
the strategy by changing the written law to make it consistent with the case outcomes."
Id at 81.
587 See id. at 80-81 (discussing why legal innovations in the United States are
relatively easily copied).
588 See supra Part II.A.
589 Gerald D. Keim & Barry D. Baysinger, The Efficacy of Business Political

Activity, in CORPORATE POLITICAL AGENCY 125, 139 (Barry M. Mitnick ed., 1993)

(noting that the question of imitability "takes the form 'will we be able to keep the value
our strategy [creates], or will we have to share that value . . . ?'

[I]mitation is . .. a

severe threat to the ability of firms whose strategies have proven successful to earn
sustained profits .... [F]or a firm to keep its potential value, it must have a strategy that
is costly for others to duplicate").
590 Richard Reed & Robert J. DeFillippi, Causal Ambiguity, Barriers to Imitation,
and Sustainable Competitive Advantage, 15 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 88, 89 (1990); accord
Day, supra note 20, at 71-72 (arguing that causal ambiguity is driven by tacit knowledge
accumulated through experience, coordination among diverse resources, and assets
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words, "the most effective barriers to imitation are achieved when
competitors do not comprehend the competencies on which the
advantage is based.""' Causal ambiguity is generated by tacitness
(skills gained through experience), complexity (having a large
number of interdependent skills and assets), and specificity (the
transaction-specific skills required for the task at issue).592 The
most potent barriers to imitation arise when several of these forces
create ambiguities together.593
A legal system's greatest fount of causal ambiguity is its
flexibility. For a legal system to afford the deepest and most
significant competitive advantages, the very system itself must be
in play; the set of opportunities must be largely unbounded, and
innovations must not automatically be institutionalized.5 94 On
average (or in a given instance, anyway), high rule of law
conditions must not hold. Both the quantity and quality of
opportunities for legal entrepreneurship vary inversely with the
degree to which the rule of law is observed.'95 This is not to say
that firms should necessarily wish for low rule of law conditions
(though in some instances they might rationally do so). Rather,
firms should look at the potential benefits, and not only at the
risks, to realistically assess a jurisdiction's attractiveness as a
business venue.
Two features, then, render the high rule of law jurisdiction a
less appealing market for legal entrepreneurs: the total set of
potential opportunities for legal advantage is circumscribed and a
legal innovator's success is far more readily neutralized.5 96 Where
the high rule of law prevails, competitors need not learn to
innovate; they need only learn to imitate.5 97 In the high rule of law
useful for the specific activities at issue).
591 Reed & DeFillippi, supra note 590, at 90.
592 Id at 89.
593 Id at 94.
594 See generally Part IV.D.I.
595 See supra notes 389, 586-585 and accompanying text (implying that higher rule
of law jurisdictions tend toward the Coasian ideal, and are thus by definition less
conducive to legal competitive advantages).
596 See supra Part III.D (stating that in low rule of law countries there are more
opportunities for legal advantage).
597
Cf supra note 590 and accompanying text (providing that causal ambiguities
help to preclude imitation by the firm's rivals).
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environment, an initial innovation creates a legal possibility,

which upon its success invariably becomes a legal rule, thereafter
to be utilized by anyone whose lawyer can copy.'
The
innovation will initially create an advantage, but its exclusivity
will fade as quickly as it appeared.5 9 9 With so many fewer
dimensions at play, lawyers in high rule of law jurisdictions can
learn to imitate quickly.oo It is true that attorneys' skillfulness can
shape legal outcomes in high rule of law environments,6 0 ' and that
legal advantages can (temporarily) be achieved, but fewer
flexibilities exist from which causal ambiguities might be bred.602
Continual reinvestment is needed in the firm's ambiguous sources
of advantage; this reinvestment should target "people with tacit
knowledge [who can] utilize that knowledge in other activities."603
Entrepreneurial lawyers are a necessary and profitable investment
for the international firm. 604
Beyond rivalry, institutional advantages are also threatened by
the changing nature of the institution itself.60 5 For an established
legal competitive advantage, there is always the risk that
authorities will change the law. This cannot be avoided but can be
managed. The law is dynamic and will constantly fluctuate, or it
will soon be replaced by a system capable of adaptation or by
lawlessness. Legal strategies must evolve as the law does.

See supra note 586 and accompanying text.
See supra note 587 and accompanying text.
600
See supra note 587 and accompanying text.
601 See, e.g., LoPucki & Weyrauch, supra note 343, at 78-79 (explaining that
superior lawyering can influence legal outcomes even in high rule of law environments
because legal rules "are necessarily incomplete in some respects and ambiguous in
others," and because "[l]egal outcomes are the products of complex human interactions
in which the lawyer can draw not just on written law, but on social norms and prejudices,
[informal rules], and virtually anything else that might persuade the decision-maker").
602 See generally Reed & DeFillippi, supra note 590 (discussing how causal
ambiguities surrounding a firm's competitive advantages impede imitation).
603 Id. at 97-98.
604 Irene Hau-siu Chow, The Relationship between EntrepreneurialOrientationand
Firm Performance in China, 71 SAM ADVANCED MGMT. J. 11, 13 (2006) (arguing that
human capital is rare, valuable, and not easily imitable, so it is an important driver of
competitive advantage). Entrepreneurial lawyers are a rare form of human capital.
605 See generally Mair & Marti, supra note 19 (presenting a case study from
Bangladesh that highlights the complexities of entrepreneurship in a country with
evolving informal institutions).
598
599
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2. FirstMover Advantages in the Legal Market
An important related issue is the timing of new legal strategies.
A "first mover" is "the first firm to (1) produce a new product, (2)
use a new process, or (3) enter a new market."60 6 First movers can
achieve cost and differentiation advantages. 607 Among other
benefits, first movers can preempt scarce resources and establish
entry barriers for later firms.60o Legal entrepreneurship enables
these advantages and more.
One may think that since low rule of law jurisdictions
generally do not institutionalize strategic legal innovations (a fact
that does tend to promote the sustainability of advantages), timing
is inconsequential. Yet timing is important, even in low rule of
law jurisdictions. Once an agency makes "an exception" 609 for a
given firm, at least two factors make subsequent exceptions for
other firms less likely. First, every exception an agency grants
will raise its monitoring and enforcement costs. Second, to the
extent that firms are treated differently under the same rule, the
agency may risk losing legitimacy. Whether and to what extent
these concerns actually materialize will vary according to the firm,
jurisdiction, context, and time. The fact that the firm first secures
a favorable legal position may bolster its competitive advantage:
the state becomes incrementally less likely to apply similar
benefits to the firm's rivals.
Rivals may respond to an advantage by imitating it, by
assessing that the advantage is not worth the trouble, or by
attempting but failing to imitate because of the advantage's
complexity. 610 "Maintainability of a first mover advantage is
Imitability
based primarily upon limiting imitability." 611
606 Kerin, Varadarajan & Peterson, supra note 540, at 33.
607 Id. at 39.

608 Yadong Luo & Mike W. Peng, First Mover Advantages in Investing in
TransitionalEconomies, 40 THUNDERBIRD INT'L BUS. REV. 141, 143 (1998).

609 A flexible legal rule is itself unclear, so it is difficult to articulate what
constitutes an "exception to the rule." "Exception" is used here to denote a manner of
treatment substantially distinguishable from how a majority of firms under similar
circumstances are treated under a particular law at a particular time, to the extent a
majority treatment can be discerned.
610 Chad Nehrt, Maintainability of First Mover Advantages When Environmental
Regulations Differ Between Countries, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 77, 86 (1998).
611 Id at 83.
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comprises many factors including causal ambiguity, the
preemption of scarce resources, the rival's awareness of the
innovation, and the competitiveness of the industry.6 12 Effective
entrepreneurial lawyers will establish legal advantages speedily.613
Firms confront three options when addressing uncertainty: the
firm can delay acting until the uncertainty is resolved, can act by
focusing its resources, or can act by spreading its resources to
account for future contingencies, thereby maintaining its own
flexibility. 614 "Since strategy is concerned with the future, the
strategic context of a firm is always uncertain, although different
firms face differing degrees of uncertainty. "615 Entrepreneurial
lawyers can reduce the firm's uncertainties, effectively simulating
a high rule of law experience in a low rule of law environment.6 16
Still, utilizing a legal flexibility can require time, so the
entrepreneurial lawyer must be both patient and aggressive.
The firm can either endure legal risks passively, or it can
attempt to manage them. The "wait and see" option is a
disadvantageous approach to legal uncertainty. 617 Rarely are legal
uncertainties definitively resolved in low rule of law places.
Legal uncertainties in these jurisdictions are either deliberately
built into the system (e.g., China) or are imposed by conditions
that are resistant to easy change (e.g., many impoverished
nations). 619 Firms cannot passively wait for legal uncertainties to
be resolved. This is unlike high rule of law jurisdictions, where
uncertainties are resolved publicly and for the sake of
predictability. 620 All other things equal, the earlier a firm can
612

Id

613 See supra Part IV.C (discussing the entrepreneurial lawyer).
614 Birger Wernerfelt & Aneel Karnani, Competitive Strategy Under Uncertainty, 8
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 187, 187-188 (1987); accordCourtney, Kirkland & Viguerie, supra
note 151, at 2-3 (noting that in the presence of uncertainty, executives' options are to
"bet big, hedge, or wait and see," and that "traditional strategic-planning processes won't
help much").
615 Wernerfelt & Karnani, supra note 614, at 189.
616 See infra Part IV.D.3.
617 See generally Johnson & Swanson, supra note 192 (advocating for proactive
risk management to control risk and reduce legal costs).
618 See generally supra Part III.D.
619 See supra Part III.D.
620 See generally supra Part III.D (discussing high and low rule of law places).
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establish competence in the legal market, the better.62 1
3. The Essence ofLegal Competitive Advantage: The
Firm'sHigh Rule ofLaw Experience in a Low Rule of
Law Environment
Much of the Coasian literature assumes uniformity in the
degree to which legal flexibilities discourage economic activity,
but this simplifying assumption is made to accommodate the
macroeconomic vantage.62 2 In reality, the extent to which flexible
laws discourage economic actors is a subjective measure.6 23 Some
firms-those more tolerant of risk and those with entrepreneurial
lawyers-will find lower rule of law jurisdictions more profitable
than the Coasian ideal.6 24 With legal competitive advantages in
place, the firm can experience a low rule of law environment as
though it is a high rule of law place, while the firm's rivals
continue to experience the jurisdiction as it exists for the average
actor. Thus, the firm's risk trajectory can be altered while those of
its rivals follow the expected path. Figure 4 illustrates these ideas:

621 Yael V. Hochberg, Alexander Ljungqvist & Yang Lu, Networking as a Barrier
to Entry and the Competitive Supply of Venture Capital, 65 J. FINANCE 829, 830 (2010)
(noting that where a market is opaque or relatively private, "[hiaving to establish
visibility, credibility, access to information, and local knowledge from scratch puts
entrants at an obvious cost and time disadvantage relative to incumbents").
622 See generally supra Part III.E (discussing the Coase Theorem).
623 See, e.g., PENROSE, supra note 570, at 58-59 (discussing subjective uncertainty).
"For any degree of uncertainty, the supply of managerial services will determine the
amount of expansion undertaken by the enterprising firm. The overcoming of
uncertainty has its cost.... But its restraining effect on expansion depends on the
resources available to meet it." Id. at 64; see also supra Part 1I.E (discussing this idea).
624 See infra Figure 4.
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While the Coase Theorem's prescription of unambiguous laws
may optimize a society's macroeconomic output, such conditions
do not necessarily favor a given individual firm. For the adroit
firm, low rule of law jurisdictions can present even more
profitable scenarios than the Coasian ideal-precisely because the
law, if it is sufficiently flexible, can serve as a source of
competitive advantage.62 5 From the individual firm's perspective,
the question is not simply the prevalence of transaction costs.62 6
Instead, the firm must consider both the costs and expected
returns-the potential net gain, should competitive advantages be
achieved.62 7 Both sides of the equation must be considered; the
entrepreneurial lawyer can change the equation by lowering costs
625 See supra Part III.
626 See supra Part III.
627 Mitnick, supra note 65, at 69 ("[Rlegulatory benefits can accrue to the same
firm that is subject to the regulatory costs, and can exceed those costs.").

420

N.C. J. INT'L L. &COM. REG.

Vol. XXXIX

and increasing the firm's legal standing relative to rivals.628
Recall the expression from Part III.E, supra: E = AA - (L + P).
A firm's economic opportunities consist of all available activities
(those that are not cost-prohibitive and that do not exceed the
firm's personal threshold for risk tolerance) which have not been
removed to the legal or political realms. 62 9 By better managing
legal flexibilities (L), the firm can reduce its legal costs and
discover new competitive advantages, which in turn enlarges the
firm's economic opportunities (or the expected value of its
activities in the economic realm, E). For any jurisdiction, a
"baseline" ratio of economic, legal, and political opportunities (as
well as available and prohibited activities) can be crafted; such a
baseline ratio represents the trajectory of the firm that passively
accepts the costs associated with legal flexibilities. To the extent
the firm's entrepreneurial lawyer favorably alters the firm's ratio
compared to the baseline figure, the firm has achieved legal
competitive advantage.
Every firm would benefit under the Coasian ideal, as each firm
would encounter fewer transaction costs on average than under
flexible institutions. But such benefits would be shared equally by
all firms. In low rule of law environments, the average firm can
expect to encounter higher transaction costs than it would in a
Coasian environment. Society's macroeconomic output will be
lower than under Coasian conditions. But this does not mean that
every firm will encounter higher transaction costs in the low rule
of law jurisdiction. 630 The costs of uncertainties, emanating from
legal flexibilities, are distributed unevenly, just as the potential
benefits of flexible laws are disbursed unevenly. 631 Several factors
drive economic success under flexible institutions. The most
important of these is the skill of the entrepreneurial lawyer.
All legal flexibilities are alike in at least one respect: it is
impossible for the firm to be literally certain about its treatment
under a flexibility prior to engaging in the activity at issue.632 If
this is false, then the law in question is not a flexibility, but is by
628
629
630
631
632

See supra Parts IV.B-C.
See supra Part III.E.
See Parts III.E and IV.
See Parts Il.E and IV.
See supra Part III.C (discussing lower rule of law states and legal flexibilities).
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For any legal question
definition a constant-a certainty.
ultimately governed by a flexibility, the firm must act under some
degree of uncertainty or else take no action at all.633 But a passive
approach to the law is seldom beneficial and will never result in
legal competitive advantage.6 34 The firm must be willing to take
sensible risks in order to achieve competitive advantages in the
law. The entrepreneurial lawyer can greatly reduce these risks.
The firm's skill at managing legal risk is equal to the degree of
"legal confidence" with which the firm can undertake a given
course of action. As Figure 4 illustrates, the degree to which the
firm successfully manages its legal risks represents the
entrepreneurial lawyer's contribution to the firm's value. By
effectively managing its legal risks, the adroit firm will experience
a low rule of law jurisdiction as though it is a higher rule of law
jurisdiction. When the firm does this and its competitors cannot,
the firm achieves legal competitive advantage.
V. Conclusion
The law itself can serve as a source of competitive advantage.
The "rule of law" describes the realm of opportunity the firm has
to harness the law to its competitive advantage. Thus, the "rule of
law" is best defined from the business perspective. Three types of
flexibility (substantive, enforcement, and systemic) exist in every
legal system, and each type can be used to craft legal competitive
advantage. The "rule of law," then, is the degree to which a legal
system reallocates opportunities from the economic realm to the
legal realm.
In order to identify and exploit opportunities for legal
competitive advantage, a new type of attorney is required: the
entrepreneurial lawyer. The entrepreneurial lawyer approaches the
law as a marketplace, much as the traditional entrepreneur
approaches the economic market. By harnessing legal flexibilities
in each jurisdiction, the entrepreneurial lawyer crafts sustainable
competitive advantages for the client.
Riskier jurisdictions (that is, low rule of law places) present
greater opportunities for legal competitive advantage than their
See supra Part III.C (discussing lower rule of law states and legal flexibilities).
634 See generally Kerin, Varadarajan & Peterson, supra note 540 (discussing the
benefits of being a first mover).
633
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higher rule of law analogues. While the Coase Theorem's
prescription of unambiguous laws may optimize a society's
macroeconomic output, such conditions do not necessarily favor a
given individual firm. For the adroit firm, low rule of law
jurisdictions can present even more profitable scenarios than the
Coasian ideal.
This article has connected the rule of law, the law as a source
of competitive advantage, and legal entrepreneurship to propose a
different view of legal strategy. We hope that this framework will
serve as a useful starting point as international firms work to
integrate the law into their strategies. Many avenues for future
research exist, and we hope to contribute to the framework's
future development.

